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Abstract
Nanofluids at very low concentrations experimentally exhibit a substantial increase in
Critical Heat Flux (CHF) compared to water. The use of a nanofluid in the In-Vessel
Retention (IVR) severe accident management strategy, employed in Advanced Light
Water Reactors, was investigated. A model simulating the two-phase flow and heat
transfer on the reactor vessel outer surface quantified the increase in decay power that can
be removed using a nanofluid, predicting that the use of a nanofluid will allow a stable
operating power ~40% greater than the power allowable using water to be achieved,
while holding the Minimum Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (MDNBR) constant.
A nanofluid injection system that would take advantage of the enhanced CHF properties
of the nanofluid in order to provide a higher safety margin than the current IVR strategy
or, for given margin, enable IVR at higher core power, is proposed. A risk-informed
analysis has revealed that this injection system has a reasonably high success probability
of 0.99, comparable to the success probability without the injection system.
Potential regulatory, environmental, and health risk issues were analyzed, and it was
concluded that the current regulatory regimes are adequate for ensuring that the
implementation of nanofluids in IVR will not endanger public health and safety.
However, experimental verification of nanofluid CHF enhancement at prototypical IVR
conditions and periodic nanofluid property testing as a surveillance requirement are
needed to reduce the key uncertainties related to nanofluid performance. Finally, a
periodic review of the health and environmental risks of nanofluids and, if necessary,
follow-up research are recommended to ensure the health of the public and environment.
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Lin-Wen Hu, Associate Director for Research Development at the MIT Nuclear
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation and Background
The threat of global warming resulting from man-made emissions of greenhouse gases
has spurred interest in carbon-free energy sources. The electric power sector is a
substantial greenhouse gas contributor, emitting roughly a third of the total greenhouse
gases worldwide. Because electricity demand worldwide is expected to continue its rapid
expansion in the future, carbon-free electricity sources are needed if the atmospheric
carbon dioxide concentration is to be held to a sufficiently low level. Of the carbon-free
electricity sources, only nuclear power can provide baseload electricity and be expanded
to meet increasing electricity demand. Increasing the amount of electricity generated by
nuclear power plants will displace other baseload electricity sources, primarily coal
power plants, reducing the world's greenhouse gas emissions. This is of particular
importance in developing countries, such as China, where the electricity demand growth
will be the greatest and where the coal plants emit greenhouse gases and other pollutants
at the highest rate.
One way to increase the amount of electricity generated by nuclear power plants is to
increase the power that each plant produces. In Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR)
systems, such as the Westinghouse AP1000 and the Korean APR1400, the power that a
plant can produce is limited by its ability to mitigate the consequences of hypothetical
severe accidents in which the core melts and relocates to the bottom of the reactor vessel.
The AP1000 and APR1400 employ an In-Vessel Retention (IVR) strategy to mitigate
these consequences. The IVR strategy consists of flooding the reactor cavity with water
and removing the residual heat from the core through the reactor vessel lower head. This
heat removal is limited by the occurrence of Critical Heat Flux (CHF) on the reactor
vessel outer surface. Recent experiments have found that nanofluids, colloidal
dispersions of nanoparticles (solid particles ranging in size from 1 to 100 nanometers) in
a base fluid (typically water), have a higher CHF than water alone. Therefore, in theory,
using a nanofluid as a coolant in IVR instead of water would allow an increase in the
power of these ALWRs.
1.2 Objectives and Overview
The effect of using a nanofluid in IVR will be quantified by modeling the two-
dimensional flow and heat transfer on the reactor vessel outer surface. The model will
then be used to predict the increase in residual heat that can be removed by using a
nanofluid to cool the reactor vessel outer surface and maintaining a constant safety
margin. The details of the model are discussed in Chapter 2 and the results of the model
are discussed in Chapter 3.
Using the results of the thermal hydraulic model, a risk-informed design of a conceptual
nanofluid injection system is developed and proposed. The integration of the nanofluid
injection system with the other systems in the nuclear power plant is considered and
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is used to quantify the impact of adding the
nanofluid injection system on the IVR performance of the plant. The design and analysis
of the nanofluid injection system is discussed in Chapter 4.
Lastly, the adequacy of the current regulatory regimes for ensuring that the
implementation of the proposed nanofluid injection system will not endanger public
health or safety is investigated. The regulatory regimes include the regime for regulating
severe accidents in nuclear power plants and the regimes for regulating adverse health
and environmental effects from toxic substances. The regulatory impact of using
nanofluids in IVR is discussed in Chapter 5.
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE THERMAL-
HYDRAULIC MODEL
This model is based upon the assumption that in the case of a core relocation severe
accident, the vessel will be cooled solely through natural circulation provided by the fluid
in the flooded reactor cavity.
2.1 Geometry, Heat Flux, and Inlet Condition Assumptions
In the Advanced Light Water Reactors (ALWRs) that this model represents, the reactor
vessel is surrounded by thermal insulation, which is necessary for normal operation. This
model defines the gap between reactor vessel outer surface and the thermal insulation to
be the rising portion of the coolant flow path. The falling portion of the flow path
(downcomer) is outside of this gap in the reactor cavity.
This model takes the Westinghouse AP1000 as a representative of ALWRs that employ
an IVR strategy. The vessel and insulation geometry is based on the geometry of the
AP1000 as defined in the University of California at Santa Barbara report, "Limits of
Coolability in the AP1000-Related ULPU-2400 Configuration V Facility" (UCSB
Report) [1]. The model's geometry is based on the 3" baffle position shown in the report.
The inlet was modified from the geometry in the UCSB Report to account for the total
inlet area for a full hemispherical reactor vessel. The UCSB Configuration V facility
models the full reactor vessel by taking a section of the full hemisphere. Figure 1 shows
this configuration.
Figure 1: Geometry taken from UCSB Report (dimensions in mm)'
The heat flux profile is based on the heat flux profile detailed in the UCSB Report [1].
Three test configurations were used in the model (labeled T48A, T40B, and T40D in the
report) and are illustrated in Figure 2. An angle of 00 corresponds to the bottom of the
reactor vessel where the surface is downward-facing and horizontal, while an angle of 900
corresponds to the side of the reactor vessel where the surface is outward-facing and
vertical.
1 Taken from [1].
Figure 2: Heat Flux Profiles used in Model
The inlet conditions in this model are also based on the information given in the UCSB
Report [1], namely that the fluid is saturated and at atmospheric pressure in the condenser
at the top of the loop. Therefore, the fluid is assumed to enter the gap between the reactor
vessel outer surface and the insulation at a temperature of 373 K at a pressure of 1.57
atm.2
A summary of the key model parameters is given in Table I.
Table I: Key Model Parameters
Vessel Inner Diameter 4.02 m
Vessel Height 6.14 m
Lower Head Height 2.31 m
Typical Gap Size 0.076 m
Inlet Temperature 373 K
Inlet Pressure 1.57 atm
2.2 Summary of Code Operation and Outputs
The code uses a given heat flux, flow geometry, and mass flow rate to calculate the flow
quality, void fraction, and temperature throughout the flow path. Combining this
2 The inlet conditions are calculated assuming no heat loss in the downcomer and a downcomer height of
6.14 m.
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information with the properties of the fluid, the density and flow velocity throughout the
flow path are determined. The properties and parameters above are calculated at nodes
along the flow path. The results of the calculations at each node are used to calculate the
properties and parameters of the next node. The first node is at the bottom of the lower
head (an angle of 00). The lower head is divided into 142 nodes spaced roughly at
intervals of 0.570. The riser section of the flow path is divided in 190 equally spaced
nodes. From the flow data, the gravity, acceleration, friction and form terms are
calculated. The mass flow rate is then adjusted until the momentum balance is satisfied.
Finally, the flow data are used with a critical heat flux correlation, modified to account
for the effect of a nanofluid, to determine the Critical Heat Flux (CHF) and the Departure
from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR).
The code can be used to determine the mass flow rate for different power levels and thus
the MDNBR for these different power levels. By comparing the MDNBR with water as
the coolant to the MDNBR with a nanofluid as the coolant, one can quantify the power
increase that can be achieved with a nanofluid while keeping the safety margin (i.e.,
MDNBR) the same. It must be emphasized that the thermodynamic and thermophysical
properties of nanofluids at the low concentrations of interest here are practically identical
to those of water [2], so the thermal-hydraulic model can be used for water and
nanofluids indifferently. The only difference is in the treatment of CHF, as explained in
Section 2.7.
2.3 Onset of Subcooled Boiling
The fluid undergoes subcooled boiling as it flows through the gap. The onset of
subcooled boiling occurs when the wall temperature exceeds the saturation temperature
of the fluid at the local pressure. The wall temperature is determined using the Dittus-
Boelter Heat Transfer Correlation, solved for wall temperature and shown in Equation
(2.1).
Twall =Tk + k (00234) (2.1)
k 0.023 -(Re)08 (Pr)0 4
DH
where: Twail = wall temperature, Tbulk = bulk fluid temperature, q"= heat flux, k = liquid thermal
conductivity, DH = hydraulic diameter of channel, Re = Reynolds number of liquid coolant, Pr = Prandtl
number of liquid coolant
The bulk temperature and the associated properties of the bulk fluid are determined based
on the energy balance, shown in Equation (2.2).
Tbulk = Tsa + Xe g - hf)
cp (2.2)
h-h 1hhle
x, ,h = hine
, +- q"dsurface
hg - hf r vessel fce
where: Tsat = saturation temperature of the liquid, Xe = equilibrium quality, h = enthalpy, hf = saturation
enthalpy of liquid, hg = saturation enthalpy of gas, hinlet = enthalpy at the inlet, Asurface = incremental
surface area of the reactor vessel, Ar = mass flow rate
2.4 Calculation of Flow Quality in Heated and Unheated
Sections
2.4.1 Heated Section
In the heated section of the flow path the Levy model [3] is used:
x = xe - Xe,onb •eX ',°  (2.3)
where: x = flow quality, Xe,onb = equilibrium quality at the onset of nucleate boiling
2.4.2 Unheated Section
The UCSB Report observes that the voids quickly collapse upon entering the unheated
section of the flow path. In order to match the model with the UCSB Report's
experimental results, the flow quality, x, is forced to go quickly to zero upon the fluid
entering the unheated section of the flow path.
As the liquid flows up the riser, the pressure is reduced and the liquid reaches saturation.
The pressure is further reduced after saturation has been reached and flashing occurs.
The quality is then given by equating the quality and the equilibrium quality, as shown in
Equation (2.4).
h-hf (2.4) - hf
X = xh (2.4)
2.5 Calculation of Void Fraction
The void fraction, a, is determined using the EPRI correlation [4], shown in Equation
(2.5).
(2.5)a=JgSCo. U, + j )+ V
where: jg = vapor superficial velocity, jf = liquid superficial velocity, Co = distribution
drift flux parameter
The distribution parameter, Co, is determined by Equation (2.6) and
parameter is determined by Equation (2.7).
parameter, Vgj =
the drift flux
Co = F, Cov + (1 - F) Co,,
Fr - .90" - ) CO= L
90°1 o (1- Ko)- a' +Ko
0.25
L - e-C"-a 4 -P .
1 - e- ' P -(P - ) 0 - Pf)
1.0 +1.57. P-
r (1 B,) = B = min(0.8,AaCOh = [+ao5 .(-a)2 ].Cov
where: 0 = angle from vertical, P = pressure, Pcrit = critical pressure
(2.6)
V = F, -Vj + (1 - F,) Vg
[ 
=\V , V = L 
1"4  .[ , -p _)[ 
0.25
Vh=Vv, V 1.41- -C -C -C -Cgth gi > fi
C2 -c ) C5
1-e'-c "
150
,C3 =max(0.50,2 
-e- R 60000 ) (2.7)
C4 = 1,if C 7 1, C4  ,if -C 7 <1 - e-C
(0.091447, C7  C9 =(la)B
D, ) 1- C7
where: a = surface tension
2.6 Momentum Balance
Knowing the properties of the fluid allows the mass flow rate to be determined through
the momentum equation:
pgravity acceleration + friction + forn (2.8)
2.6.1 Gravity Term
The gravity term in the momentum equation is the driving force in natural circulation
flow, shown in Equation (2.9). The difference between the average densities within the
gap and outside of the gap provides this driving force.
APg,,ra = (p - Pchannel,, ) g -h (2.9)
where: Pcavity = density of liquid inside of the cavity but outside of the channel, Pchannel = average height-
weighted density of the two-phase mixture inside of the channel, g = acceleration due to gravity, h = height
of channel
2.6.2 Acceleration Term
The acceleration term is determined by summing the incremental pressure losses due to
acceleration within the gap:
P~ =C = (h2acceleration = AI A p.A J (1SA L po Ao p. Ai (2.10)
-1 x2 (1-x)2A= 0.5 -(Ao + Ai -- = 1 - +
Pm. a pg (- a) -pf
where: A = average area of incremental inlet and incremental outlet, Ai = area at the incremental inlet, Ao
= area at the incremental outlet, P+,o = mixture density at the incremental outlet, pm, = mixture density at
the incremental inlet, x = coolant flow quality, pg = density of vapor coolant, pf = density of liquid coolant,
a = void fraction of coolant
2.6.3 Friction Term
Similarly, the pressure loss due to the friction term is determined by summing the
incremental friction losses within the gap, shown in Equation (2.11). The flow is
assumed to be turbulent throughout the gap. This assumption is verified upon the
determination of the mass flow rate and the subsequent calculation of the Reynolds
Number.
0.184 .1- G 2
APftiction = Re 2 - D (2.11)
g2.Reo2-DH *Pf
where: pf = density of liquid coolant, G = mass flux, Re = Reynolds's Number of coolant, I =
characteristic length = average length of incremental volume, DH = hydraulic diameter of gap = Dexterior -
Dinterior, 02 = two-phase friction multiplier
Because the flow is two-phase in some regions of the gap, the two-phase friction
multiplier is included, shown in Equation (2.12) [3].
3.24 -A2 A3
Fr0.045 We0.035
AI =(l-x)2 +X2 jf P.jf! ,A 2 =X0.78 .(1_X)0.224
A3  j 0.91 0.19 (2.12)
We= H Fr= .2 ,P = + 1-
0.0589 -. g -DH
where: Fr = Froude Number, We = Weber Number, pf = dynamic viscosity of liquid coolant, pg =
dynamic viscosity of vapor coolant, , = average density of coolant
2.6.4 Form Term
The form term is given by Equation (2.13). It is based on the form pressure losses of the
gap inlet structure and the gap outlet, which occurs as the two-phase mixture turns and
exits the rising portion of the gap through four rectangular vents. Here the value of kin,,t
is set equal to 0.5.
kilt . fi12 ke. ?h 2 VAP k, 2  + *ri2  2 (2.13)
2ofr pl' Ptinte Anter 2 -Pl, xt -A,t
where: Aintet = inlet area, Aeit = vent (exit) area, kext = form factor of vent (exit), P, inlet = liquid density at
the inlet, Pl,exit= liquid density at the exit
Because the value of the form factor at the exit is difficult to determine theoretically, it is
determined indirectly by using the experimental value of the mass flow rate and solving
the momentum equation for the form factor at the exit.
2.7 CHF Correlation
An appropriate CHF correlation for this application, which accounts for surface
orientation effects, is the SULTAN correlation [5], shown in Equation (2.14). This
correlation is based on experimental results obtained from a hemispherical geometry
similar to this model's geometry.
qcHF = Ao(s, P, G) + Al (s, G) -x, + A2 (s) -x' + A3 (s, P,G,xe) -0 + A4 (s,P, G,xe) 02
Ao = bo + b, s- In(G)+b 2 /P2 +b3 " G+b 4 • s/P+b5 slp 2 + b6 . -P(ln(G))2
A, = b7 (In(G))2 + b8s In(G), A2 = b9s,
A3 = b1o. (n(G)) 2 + b1 .s P + b12 xe In(G), A4 = b13 P + bl4. In(G) + b,5 -x, + b16 s
bo = 0.65444,b, = -1.2018,b2 = -0.008388,b3 = 0.000179,b4 = 1.36899, (2.14)
b1 = -0.077415,b6 = 0.024967,b7 = -0.086511,b, = -4.49425,b, = 9.28489,
bl0 = -0.0066169,bI = 11.62546,b12 = 0.855759,b13 = -1.74177,
b14 = 0.182895,b15 = -1.8898,b16 = 2.2636
where: P = coolant pressure in [MPa], s = channel gap size in [m], G = mass flux in [kg/m2-s], O =angle
from horizontal [rad], q"~F = critical heat flux in [MW/m2]
Figure 3 shows the relationship between CHF, xe, and 0 for G = 500 kg/m2-s and Figure 4
shows the same relationship for G = 3000 kg/m2-s. The figures show that CHF increases
with increasing angle and with increasing mass flux, but decreases with increasing
equilibrium quality. It should also be noted that although the correlation does give non-
physical negative values for CHF is some instances, the flow parameter range in this
model always results in positive values for CHF. For example, the equilibrium quality is
smallest at small angles and the mass flux is smallest at large angles.
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Figure 3: CHF versus Equilibrium Quality (G = 500 kg/m 2-s, P = 0.1 MPa)
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Figure 4: CHF versus Equilibrium Quality (G = 3000 kg/m2.s, P = 0.1 MPa)
2.7.1 Effect of Nanofluids on CHF
Because CHF data for nanofluids at prototypical IVR conditions are lacking, in order to
account for the effect that a nanofluid has on CHF, a multiplier that accounts for the
increased CHF compared to water is used. This multiplier is dependant on orientation.
This model assumes that the CHF of a nanofluid is related to the CHF of water as
described in [6]. The CHF for a nanofluid is expressed as a multiplier to the CHF of
water and accounts for the orientation effects of nanofluid boiling. This relationship is
illustrated in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Nanofluid CHF Multiplier Angular Dependence
As in Figure 2, an angle of 00 corresponds to the bottom of the reactor vessel where the
surface is downward-facing and horizontal, while an angle of 900 corresponds to the side
of the reactor vessel where the surface is outward-facing and vertical.
Experimental results at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) [2] found that a
0.001% by volume alumina nanofluid enhances CHF by a factor of approximately 1.4
compared to the pure water case. Combining the angular dependence in Figure 5 with the
MIT experimental results by shifting the curve downwards, the nanofluid CHF multiplier
used in the model is found (shown in Figure 6). The model assumes that when using a
nanofluid as the coolant, the nanofluid will be uniformly mixed and behave according to
the relationship shown in Figure 6.
3.5
Angle (Degrees)
Figure 6: Nanofluid CHF Multiplier Used in Model
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3. MODEL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Various relationships between the flow parameters produced by the model were
compared to expected trends and experimental results in order to ensure that the model
was reasonably accurate. All of the following graphs used the T48A heat flux profile
shown in Figure 1 as the heat flux input into the model.
3.1 Graphs of Void Fraction and Quality
Figure 7 and Figure 8 illustrate void fraction versus height and quality versus height,
respectively. Height refers to the vertical distance above the bottom of the reactor vessel
lower head.
Void Fraction
Figure 7: Void Fraction versus Height
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Quality
Figure 8: Quality versus Height
At a height of 2.1 m the heat flux goes to zero in the T48A heat flux profile. At this point
the two-phase mixture is subcooled. The UCSB Report observed that the voids quickly
collapsed [1]. In order to calibrate this model to these observations, the voids were
forced to collapse under subcooled conditions as discussed in Section 2.4.2. Eventually
as the pressure decreases with the increasing height, the fluid becomes saturated and the
void fraction and quality increase due to flashing. These trends shown in Figures 7 and 8
are consistent with the experimental results documented in the UCSB Report.
3.2 Calculation of Exit Form Loss Factor
By inputting the three heat flux profiles in Figure 1 with their experimentally determined
mass flow rates, one can determine a value for kit. A least-squared fit analysis of the
values of keit associated with the different heat flux profiles gives a kexit = 1.35. Table II
shows that using this value of kt, the mass flow rates given by the model are within 2%
of the experimental mass flow rates in all three cases.
Table II: Comparison of Mass Flow Rates at k -= 1.35
Heat Flux Power UCSB Mass Flow Model Mass Flow PercentageDifferenceProfile (MW) Rate (kg/s) Rate (kg/s) Difference
T48A 18.9 860 860 0.0
T40B 18.6 858.7 868 +1.1
T40D 10.3 785.3 769.5 -2.0
3.3 Graphs of CHF and DNBR
Figure 9 and Figure 10 illustrate the height dependence of CHF and DNBR for water and
nanofluid, respectively. Note that the blip in the CHF graph at a height of 0.3 m is an
effect of the geometry. The flow area is rapidly increasing from the inlet to the baffle,
which strongly reduces the mass flux and CHF. However, the CHF starts to rise again
because of the effect of the surface orientation. The notable feature of Figure 10 is that
the worst-case (lowest) value of DNBR occurs very near the top of the heated section,
which is consistent with experimental observations in the UCSB Report.
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Figure 9: CHF versus Height
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Figure 10: DNBR versus Height
3.4 DNBR at Increased Residual Power
The model can be used to determine the increase in residual power that a nanofluid can
accommodate over water at the same safety margin (MDNBR). This is done by equating
the MDNBR of pure water at the original residual power to the MDNBR of a nanofluid at
an increased residual power. Figure 11 shows the model's predictions of the maximum
power that can be achieved with a nanofluid as well as the corresponding mass flow rates.
Note that the mass flow rate versus power curve has a peak at around 30 MW. This trend
is expected in a natural circulation system and is due to the competing effects of
increasing gravity head (via the change in two-phase density) and hydraulic resistance
(via the increase in two-phase multiplier), as the thermal power increases. A
mathematical explanation of the peak is presented in Appendix A.1.
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Figure 11: Operating Conditions versus Power
The maximum power achievable with nanofluids would appear to be 26.8 MW, or 142%
of the power achieved using water at the same MDNBR value.
3.5 Effect of Flow Stability
At the higher power levels and corresponding mass flow rates, the stability of the system
must be checked as large flow oscillations could cause premature CHF. There are three
types of flow instabilities: (1) flow excursion oscillation (static), (2) density-wave
oscillation (dynamic), and (3) pressure-drop (dynamic).
3.5.1 Flow Excursion Oscillation Instabilities
In non-dimensional terms, flow excursion instability in natural circulation flows occurs in
the region in which 0.7<N1N,<3.0, where Np is the phase change (Zuber) number and N,
is the subcooling number [7], defined in Equation (3.1). This system enters the region of
instability at 32 MW as shown in Figure 12.
QoPf,NP = , NsAGhfg p
where: Qo = maximum power, Ah = subcooled enthalpy
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Figure 12: System Stability
3.5.2 Density-wave Oscillation Instabilities
Density-wave oscillation instabilities are investigated using the Saha, Ishii, and Zuber
stability criterion [8]. For high subcooling numbers (N,>3), a system is stable against
density-wave oscillation instabilities when the inequality given in Equation (3.2) is
satisfied.
N, > N -
2 - ki.e + , + k.L
(3.2)
0 .L + 21+0.5. +2.k
where:ftp = two-phase friction factor, L = length of channel
Table III shows the system values for Equation (3.2) at various power levels.
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Table III: Density-wave Oscillation Stability
Power Np N, Right Hand Side
of Inequality Sait
7.6 6.8 36.1 5.2 Stable
11.3 9.8 36.1 8.1 Stable
15.1 12.7 36.1 11.0 Stable
18.9 15.4 36.1 13.6 Stable
22.7 18.0 36.1 16.2 Stable
26.5 20.6 36.1 18.7 Stable
30.3 23.6 36.1 21.7 Stable
34.0 27.3 36.1 25.4 Stable
37.8 31.4 36.1 29.4 Stable
39.7 33.5 36.1 31.5 Stable
47.3 42.7 36.1 40.7 Unstable
The system is stable against density-wave oscillation instabilities
39.7 MW.
up to at least a power of
3.5.3 Dynamic Pressure-drop Instabilities
The necessary condition for this type of instability is that the pressure loss versus mass
flow rate curve have a slope reversal around the equilibrium mass flow rate point [9].
Figure 13 illustrates that the slope does not reverse around any of the equilibrium mass
flow rate points associated with power levels up to 34 MW.
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Figure 13: Pressure Loss versus Mass Flow Rate Curves at Varying Power Levels
3.5.4 Operating Range of the System
Flow excursion oscillation instabilities are the most limiting type of instability in this
system. Figure 14 integrates Figure 11 and Figure 12 and shows the operating range of
the system, including the maximum stable power and the associated mass flow rate. In
this case, the operating power is limited by MDNBR not by stability.
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Figure 14: Operating Range of the System
3.6 Sensitivity Analysis on the Nanofluid CHF Multiplier
In order to see the sensitivity of the model results to the CHF nanofluid multiplier, a set
of three multipliers were used as shown in Figure 15.
4.5
Figure 15: Set of Nanofluid CHF Multipliers used in Model
Figure 16 shows the impact of the nanofluid CHF multiplier on the maximum residual
power that can be removed while keeping the MDNBR equal to that of water at nominal
power (18.9 MW). Note that even assuming a nanofluid CHF multiplier that is 75% of
the nominal multiplier shown experimentally, the power is still slightly higher than the
18.9 MW in the case of water (20 MW versus 18.9 MW). One can see that the effect of
the CHF Nanofluid Multiplier varies roughly linearly with power: varying the CHF
Nanofluid Multiplier by 25% in either direction roughly corresponds to a 25% change in
power. Using Figure 15 one can also see that a power of 32 MW corresponds to 120% of
the nominal nanofluid CHF multiplier. One will not be limited by stability unless the
CHF nanofluid multiplier that is achieved is greater than 120% of nominal.
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Figure 16: Sensitivity of Power to CHF Nanofluid Multiplier
The effect of varying the nanofluid CHF multiplier on the operating range of the system
is shown in Figure 17. One can see that in the 125% case, the maximum stable operating
power is limited by stability, while in the 100% and 75% cases the maximum stable
operating power is limited by MDNBR.
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Figure 17: Effect of a Varying Nanofluid CHF Multiplier on Operating Range
3.7 Summary of the Model
Using energy and momentum balances, this model of the two-dimensional flow and heat
transfer along the reactor vessel outer surface was created. It simulates the conditions of
a severe accident in which the core melts and relocates to the bottom of the reactor vessel
and shows that under those conditions the use of a nanofluid is more effective than water
in an IVR strategy. This model fits the experimental results conducted with water
reasonably well.
This model shows that the increase in residual power that a nanofluid provides and the
nanofluid CHF multiplier are related roughly linearly, keeping the worst-case DNBR
constant. This model predicts that using a nanofluid, a stable operating power that is
142% of water can be achieved.
Finding #1: Using a nanofluid as the coolant in IVR could allow a -40% increase
in the power compared to using water as a coolant, while maintaining the same
safety margin.
4. CONCEPTUAL NANOFLUID INJECTION
SYSTEM DESIGN
The results of the thermal hydraulic model presented in Chapters 2 and 3 show that
nanofluids would be able to increase the DNBR margin in the IVR severe accident
mitigation strategy. In order for this enhancement to be achieved at an actual nuclear
power plant, a system must be designed that is able to deliver the nanofluid to the reactor
cavity if the core melts and relocates during a severe accident. This system must also be
integrated into the overall design of the power plant. This chapter of the report
investigates these design requirements and proposes a conceptual nanofluid injection
design for the Westinghouse AP1000 nuclear reactor, which is taken as a representative
of ALWRs that employ an IVR strategy.
4.1 General Design Considerations
The most general considerations in the design of a nanofluid injection system are: (1)
integration with the current reactor design and (2) quality control of the nanofluid before
injection. The nanofluid injection system should interface with the current reactor design
in a manner that does not interfere with the other functions of the reactor safety, control,
and auxiliary systems. Because the nanofluid is only effective at enhancing CHF when it
is a stable colloidal suspension, the system must be designed such that the quality of the
nanofluid can be controlled effectively. In order to address these general considerations
the current reactor design and procedures must be investigated.
4.1.1 Current IVR Strategy and Coolant Quality Control Procedures
The IVR severe accident mitigation strategy has the ultimate goal of preventing the
molten core from breaching the reactor vessel. More specifically, upon the melting of the
core and its relocation to the bottom of the reactor vessel, the core melt is contained by
cooling the outer surface of the reactor vessel thus preventing the vessel from melting or
even softening. The outer surface of the vessel is cooled passively by the natural
circulation of the water in the reactor cavity after it has been flooded. Figure 18 and
Figure 19 are views of the reactor vessel and cavity after flooding has occurred.
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Figure 18: Detailed View of Reactor Cavity after Core Melt and Relocation 3
Figure 19: Overview of Flooded Reactor Cavity4
3 Adapted from [10].
4 Adapted from [ 11].
The critical factor in the current IVR strategy is ensuring that the cavity is flooded in
sufficient time to prevent vessel breach. For an IVR strategy that uses a nanofluid, the
cavity must be flooded with the nanofluid in sufficient time. The water that floods the
reactor cavity comes from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and the In-Containment
Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST). Under normal operation, the RCS removes
heat from the reactor core which is eventually used for power generation. The RCS
consists of two steam generators, four reactor coolant pumps, and one pressurizer [12].
The IRWST is a large tank inside the containment that provides water for refueling and
for core emergency cooling after the RCS is depressurized [13]. Successful
depressurization of the RCS is assumed for successful IVR implementation; therefore, the
AP1000 PRA assumes that the reactor cavity is full of water from the RCS up to at least
the 83' (25.3 m) elevation [12]. The remainder of the cavity is flooded either through the
progression of the accident or through the operator action to manually drain the IRWST
water into the containment through the IRWST recirculation lines [13]. Sufficient cavity
flooding for IVR is defined as flooding up to the 98' (29.9 m) elevation. The floodable
region of the containment extends up to the 107' 2" (32.7 m) elevation [13], which is the
level that this analysis assumes the cavity eventually floods up to.
The quality of the coolant in the RCS and the IRWST is important because although the
coolant is mainly water, the water notably contains boric acid (for long-term reactivity
control) and lithium hydroxide (for pH control) [12]. The concentration of boric acid
ranges from 2500 to 3000 ppm in the containment water [14]. The IRWST and RCS are
sampled periodically to ensure proper chemistry [12]. In addition, the containment
contains trisodium phosphate (in concentrations ranging from 3500 to 6000 ppm [14]) in
order to maintain a pH between 7.0 and 9.5 after the cavity is flooded [12]. This pH
range helps to retain the fission product particulates in the water, which in turn reduces
the source term for radioactivity release into the environment if a core meltdown and
containment breach were to occur.
4.1.2 Initial Design Options
Based on the current reactor design in the AP1000, the nanofluid must either replace
water as the coolant in the IRWST and the RCS or nanoparticles must be mixed with the
water to create a nanofluid in the event of a severe accident. Because the IRWST and
RCS have a myriad of other functions not associated with IVR, having nanofluid in these
systems at all times could potentially lead to problems with these functions. One of the
potentially problematic issues with integration is maintaining the quality of the nanofluid
in the presence of the other chemicals in these systems. Long-term interactions with the
chemical environments in the RCS and IRWST as well as the agitation the nanofluid
would undergo as part of these systems could lead to agglomeration of the nanoparticles
in the nanofluid, resulting in a reduction in the desired CHF enhancement. In addition if
agglomeration occurs, an additional system that mixes in nanofluids to maintain the
proper nanoparticle concentration would be required. Because of these complications,
the option to mix nanoparticles with the water from the RCS and IRWST in the event of a
severe accident is more attractive.
Because only a very small amount of nanoparticles needs to be mixed into a base fluid to
see the desired CHF enhancement, it is possible to store concentrated nanofluid in
relatively small tanks.5 This concentrated nanofluid can be mixed with the water from
the IRWST and RCS to produce a large amount of nanofluid with an overall (low)
concentration that corresponds to the desired CHF enhancement. By storing the
nanofluid in separate storage tanks, it is easier to maintain the quality of the nanofluid
and simpler to integrate the injection system with the rest of the safety systems.
4.1.2.1 Nanofluid Selection
A nanofluid must be properly selected in order to ensure that it remains stable during
storage and after injection. Many nanofluids with oxide-based nanoparticles are stable
for concentrations up to 20% by weight when their pH is adjusted to create like electric
charges on the nanoparticle surface. For example, nanofluids made using alumina
nanoparticles are stable when an acid is added to reduce the pH to around 4. If this
concentrated nanofluid is injected into the flooded reactor cavity as envisioned in this
system, it will be diluted and the pH will increase, potentially resulting in agglomeration
of the nanoparticles and thus an unstable nanofluid. Under the severe accident scenarios
that employ IVR, good nanofluid stability is needed for less than a day,6 as the additional
heat removal capabilities of a stable nanofluid over water are needed only towards the
beginning of the severe accident while the decay heat is high. In order to evaluate the
effects of dilution on nanofluid stability, dilution experiments were conducted. This
experiment consisted of diluting concentrated alumina nanofluid (similar to the
concentration in the storage tanks) to lower concentrations (sufficient to see the desired
CHF enhancement) and then measuring the sizes of the nanoparticles over time. Large
increases in the size of the nanoparticles would indicate nanoparticle agglomeration and
thus an unstable nanofluid. The summarized results given in Table IV show that the
changes in the nanoparticle size are within the experimental uncertainty (± 20 nm) of the
dynamic-light-scattering particle measurement device chosen for these measurements.
These results indicate that upon dilution little agglomeration occurs and the nanofluid
remains stable. The details of this experiment are included in section B.1 of Appendix B.
Table IV: Mean Alumina Nanoparticle Diameter after Dilution
Time after _Concentration
20% 0.01% 0.001%
(by weight) (by volume) (by volume)
0 37.8 nm N/A N/A
1 N/A 42.6 nm 52.3 nm
6 N/A 32.6 nm 33.4 nm
24 N/A 46.7 nm 46.7 nm
5 Maintaining the quality of and delivering the nanoparticles is much simplified if they are in concentrated
colloidal suspension form as opposed to powder form.
6 This calculation is shown in section A.1 of the Appendix.
In addition to investigating the changes in the sizes of the particles, measuring changes in
nanoparticle concentration can also be used to evaluate the effects of dilution on
nanofluid stability. This experiment consisted of diluting concentrated alumina nanofluid
to lower concentrations and then measuring the concentrations of the nanoparticles over
time. Any decrease in the nanoparticle concentration would indicate nanoparticle
agglomeration and thus an unstable nanofluid. Table V shows the percentage differences
of the actual, measured concentrations compared to the predicted concentrations if all the
nanoparticles were to remain in solution. These results also indicate that upon dilution
little agglomeration occurs and the nanofluid remains stable. The details of this
experiment are included in section B.2 of Appendix B.
Table V: Actual Nanoparticle Concentration Difference after Dilution
Time after _Concentration
dilution (hr) 20% 0.01% 0.001%
(by weight) (by volume) (by volume)
0 -3.9% N/A N/A
1 N/A 3.6% -6.0%
6 N/A 1.9% 2.2%
24 N/A 13.9% 18.2%
These experiments indicate that alumina nanofluid may be a good candidate for use in
this nanofluid injection system. Alumina nanofluid is manufactured by several
companies, notably Nyacol Nano Technologies, Inc. Table VI includes manufacturer-
specified properties of commercially sold alumina nanofluid [15].
Table VI: Alumina Nanofluid Properties
Composition Aluminum Hydroxide Oxide (20-25% by weight), NitricAcid (<1% by weight), Water (75-79% by weight)
pH 4
Density 1200 kg/m3
Boiling Point 1000 C
Freezing Point 00 C
Other factors that need to be considered before making a final selection of a nanofluid
are: (1) the response of the nanofluid to the dose of radiation it would be exposed to
during IVR and (2) the response of the nanofluid to the coolant chemistry of it would
encounter in the reactor cavity. Preliminary results of experiments conducted at MIT
suggest that alumina nanofluid manufactured by Nyacol Nano Technologies, Inc. is
stable when exposed to doses of radiation it would encounter in IVR but unstable when
combined with trisodium phosphate [16]. This is an area that will require further
investigation.
4.1.2.2 Concentrated Nanofluid Storage Tank Specifications
The required volume of concentrated nanofluid and thus the required capacity of the
storage tanks can be determined by the volume of the fluid that it takes to flood the
reactor cavity. In the Westinghouse AP 1000 the volume of the flooded reactor cavity is
2503 m' [17].7 The sizing of the storage tanks is based on a alumina nanofluid with a
base fluid of water because it is one of the most widely available, stable, and affordable
nanofluids. The concentration that is needed to attain the desired CHF enhancement is
0.001% alumina by volume [2]. Given that the nanofluid needs to fill the entire flooded
reactor cavity, a total of 25.03 L of alumina is required s, which using a density of 3970
kg/m3 for alumina [18] results in a required mass of 99.37 kg of alumina. A typical
maximum concentration for alumina nanofluids is a loading of 20% alumina by mass.9
At a 20% mass loading, conservatively assuming a density of water in the tank at
saturated conditions and 2 atm, the minimum required volume of concentrated nanofluid
is 447 L.1'
The material that a nanofluid storage tank should be constructed of depends on the
conditions that the tank will operate under and the chemical composition of the contents
of the tank. The operating conditions for the tank are a temperature close to the normal
containment temperature of 295 K (700 F) [13] and a pressure of slightly above
atmospheric pressure (resulting in a pressure gradient no greater than 2.5 atm in all
relevant accident scenarios [13]). Concentrated alumina nanofluid with a 20% mass
loading has a pH of 4 and contains low concentrations of nitric acid [15]. Similar tanks
in nuclear reactors typically are constructed of annealed Stainless Steel 316 [19].
Although annealed Stainless Steel has "broad applicability" to nitric acid service [20],
Titanium Grade 2 is a better option as it "used in applications where in which stainless
steels have experienced significant uniform or intergranular attack" as it has "excellent
resistance over the full concentration range at subboiling temperatures" [20].
The tank is designed to deliver all of its contents to the reactor cavity; however, because a
minimal amount of fluid will accumulate on the walls of the tank and the pipes, the
design capacity of the tank should be slightly higher than the minimum volume that needs
to be delivered. Therefore, the design capacity of a tank is -500 L, which corresponds to
a cylindrical tank with dimensions of -100 cm (diameter) and -64 cm (height). Given
the operating conditions, the thickness of the tank would not need to exceed the standard
tank thicknesses of 0.125 in for the shell and 0.1875 in for the head (0.32 cm for the shell
and 0.48 cm for the head) [21]. Additionally, the tank would require an N-stamp
certification to be part of a safety system in a nuclear power plant.
The tank specifications are summarized in Table VII.
7 5,200,000 lb saturated water at 2 atm = (5,200,000 lb)(0.017 ftl3/lb) = 88400 ft' = 2503 m' .
S (2503 m3)(0.001%) = 0.02503 m3 = 25.03 L
9 As prepared by Nyacol Nano Technologies for its AL20 nanofluid
0o Volume of water = (99.37 kg alumina)/20% - 99.37 kg alumina = 397.48 kg water-(1 m3/942.6 kg) =
0.422 m3 water; total volume = 0.422 m' + 0.02503 m' = 0.447 m3 = 447 L
Table VII: Tank Specifications
Material Titanium Grade 2
Certification N-stamp
Design Pressure 2.5 atm
Design Temperature 300 K
Capacity -500 L
Dimensions -100 cm (diameter), -64 cm (height)
Thickness 0.32 cm (shell), 0.48 cm (head)
2.5-cm diameter nozzle on top (1),
2.5-cm diameter on bottom (1)
Supports Vertical supports (2)
The tanks would need to be located above the IRWST to ensure that the nanofluid could
be passively injected by gravity into the reactor cavity. A general location for the tanks is
proposed in Figure 20.
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Figure 20: Proposed Location of Nanofluid Storage Tanks"
" Adapted from [22].
4.1.2.3 Initial Design Option Details
The nanofluid storage tanks need to be arranged in a configuration such that their
contents can be mixed with water from the normal reactor safety systems and delivered
into the reactor cavity within the time required by the IVR severe accident mitigation
strategy. Three initial design options were considered.
Design Option #1: Nanofluid tanks inject directly into the reactor cavity
The first design option involves the injection of the concentrated nanofluid directly into
the reactor cavity. The two nanofluid storage tanks are redundant, with each tank
containing a sufficient amount of nanoparticles to provide the desired CHF enhancement
when diluted by the water from the RCS and IRWST. Each tank is also equipped with
one injection line and a gas accumulator. The accumulator on each tank provides a slight
overpressure to aid the nanofluid injection. Each injection line is equipped with a motor-
operated valve. The injection lines from the two tanks are cross-tied close to the injection
points. The cross-tie line ensures that in the event of the failure of one of the injection
lines the nanofluid will still be injected through all of the injection points. The injection
lines also have spargers at their injection points to facilitate mixing. In this design, the
injection line valves will open following a severe accident and nanofluid will be injected
directly into the partially flooded cavity. The concentrated nanofluid will mix with the
water in the cavity from the RCS and the IRWST. The diluted nanofluid will flow via
natural circulation and remove heat from the outside of the reactor vessel with enhanced
CHF capabilities. Design Option #1 is shown in Figure 21.
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Figure 21: Nanofluid Tanks Inject directly into the Reactor Cavity (Design Option #1)
Design Option #2: Nanofluid tanks inject into the IR WST recirculation lines
The second design option is similar to the first except the nanofluid tank injection lines
are connected to the IRWST recirculation lines that are used to manually flood the reactor
cavity. The nanofluid tank injection lines connect to the IRWST recirculation lines
below both the squib and motor-operated valves on the IRWST lines. In this design the
concentrated nanofluid will mix with the water flowing from the IRWST into the reactor
cavity. This mixture of concentrated nanofluid and water from the IRWST will then mix
with the water from the RCS already in the cavity. The fully-diluted nanofluid will then
remove the heat from the reactor vessel via natural circulation. Design Option #2 is
shown in Figure 22.
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Figure 22: Nanofluid Tanks Inject into the IRWST Recirculation Lines (Design Option #2)
Design Option #3: Nanofluid tanks inject into the IRWST
The third initial design option injects concentrated nanofluid from the nanofluid storage
tanks into the IRWST. In this design the concentrated nanofluid will mix with the water
in the IRWST as they flow through the IRWST recirculation lines into the cavity. This
mixture will then mix with the RCS water that is already present in the cavity and the
fully-diluted nanofluid will cool the reactor vessel. Design Option #3 is shown in Figure
23.
Figure 23: Nanofluid Tanks Inject into the IRWST (Design Option #3)
4.1.2.4 Cost Estimate
Because this nanofluid injection system is designed to be implemented in a commercial
nuclear power plant, it is important to determine if the system will be prohibitively
expensive and thus unfeasible for commercial use.
Each of the three designs consists of two nanofluid storage tanks, two accumulators, and
two motor-operated valves with identical specifications. The injections lines are also
identically sized in all three designs. The length of the lines, the presence of spargers,
and the implementation costs could vary between the designs. Any variance, however, is
likely to be small compared to the uncertainties in the analysis; therefore, a single cost
estimate will suffice for all the designs.
The major factors in determining the total cost of the injection system are the costs of: the
nanofluid storage tanks, the valves, the accumulators, the injection lines, the nanofluid,
implementation, and maintenance. The nanofluid storage tanks constructed to the
specifications in Table VII are estimated to cost roughly $35,000 each [21]. The valves,
accumulators, injection lines, and nanofluid are estimated to cost roughly $70,000,12
resulting in a total system material cost of $140,000. The maintenance costs for the
system should be minimal. Although periodically the valves will need to be checked and
the nanofluid will need to be sampled and analyzed, these maintenance activities can be
easily integrated into the existing maintenance schedule consisting of similar tasks, to be
performed during outages. Based on this simple cost analysis, it is concluded that the
cost of adding a nanofluid injection system could be very low.
4.2 Detailed Design Considerations
The three initial design options are similar in that they all contain the same number of
nanofluid storage tanks, the same number of injection lines, and the same number of
valves. The differences between the designs are more subtle and require an in-depth
investigation of the safety systems that the nanofluid injection system will be interfacing
with under the accident sequences that lead to the need for IVR.
4.2.1 Accident Sequences Leading to the Need for IVR
Accident sequences are grouped together into accident classes based upon their general
characteristics and the final damage states that can result. The accident classes that will
impact the design of the nanofluid injection system are all those accident classes
containing sequences that require IVR to mitigate their damage states. The AP 1000 PRA
identifies six such accident classes: 3BE, 3BL, 3C, 3BR, lD, and 3D [13].
4.2.1.1 Accident Class Definitions
Accident Class 3BE
Accident class 3BE includes fully depressurized accident sequences with failure of
gravity injection. The gravity injection failure results in core damage. The initiating
event for accident sequences in this accident class may be a reactor coolant system pipe
break, spurious actuation of the automatic depressurization system (ADS), or a direct
vessel injection line break. A small loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) or spurious
actuation of the ADS with failure of gravity injection will not result in the reflooding of
the reactor vessel and core damage will result. A direct vessel injection line break could
result in reactor vessel reflooding but the reflooding will not occur quickly enough to
prevent core damage [13].
12 Nanofluid ($5,000) [23] + Valves ($45,000) [24] + Injection lines ($18,000) [25] + Accumulators
($2,000) [26] = $70,000.
Accident Class 3BL
Accident class 3BL includes accident sequences in which gravity recirculation fails (after
successful gravity injection). The core will eventually be uncovered and core damage
will occur because failed recirculation after injection results in no available water to flood
the core [13].
Accident Class 3BR
Accident class 3BR includes accident sequences that result from a large LOCA and a
failure of accumulator core reflood. Neither the core makeup tank (CMT) nor the
IRWST is able to inject into the reactor vessel quickly enough to prevent core damage
[13].
Accident Class 3C
Accident class 3C includes accident sequences that are initiated by a large failure of the
reactor vessel below the top of the core. ADS and gravity injection are successful, but
core damage will occur because the core will not be fully reflooded before the reactor
cavity fills with water above the level of the core [13].
Accident Classes 3D and ID
Accident classes 3D and ID include accident sequences that are only partially
depressurized such that sufficient gravity injection fails, resulting in core damage [13].
4.2.1.2 Requirements for Reactor Cavity Flooding
The reactor cavity is flooded either through the progression of the accident sequence or
by manually draining the IRWST. In the 3BE, 3D, and ID accident classes gravity
injection fails and thus the cavity will not be completely flooded as a result of the
accident sequence. These accident classes require that the IRWST to be manually
drained in order to flood the reactor cavity to a sufficient level for IVR. In contrast, the
3BL, 3BR, and 3C accident classes do not require any manual action to flood the reactor
cavity as the cavity will be flooded as a result of the accident progression. In accident
class 3BL, recirculation fails after successful injection so water will be in the cavity in
these accident sequences. In accident class 3BR, the IRWST injects but not rapidly
enough to prevent core damage so the cavity will have to be flooded if IVR is needed
later in the accident sequence. In accident class 3C, the rupture of the reactor vessel will
ensure that the water from the successful gravity injection will be in the reactor cavity if
IVR is needed later in the accident sequence. The cavity flooding requirements for the
accident classes that could lead to the need for IVR are summarized in Table VIII.
Table VIII: Reactor Cavity Flooding Requirements for Core Relocation Accident Classes
Accident Class Cavity Flooding Action to Flood
3BE Required Manual
3BL Required None
3BR Required None
3C Required None
3D/1D Required Manual
4.2.2 System Integration
The nanofluid injection system will most critically need to integrate with the existing
IRWST design. Additionally, the design of the system will also need to take the RCS
inventory and the current IVR strategy into consideration.
4.2.2.1 IRWST Design Details
The major functions of the IRWST are to "provide flooding of the refueling cavity for
normal refueling, post-loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) flooding of the containment to
establish long-term reactor coolant system (RCS) cooling, and to support the passive
residual heat removal (PRHR) heat exchangers (HXs) operation" [13].
In the accident classes that do not require manual action to flood the reactor cavity (3BL,
3BR, and 3C), the water from IRWST is injected into the reactor cavity prior to IVR. In
the accident classes that do require manual action to flood the reactor cavity (3BE, 3D,
and lD), the IRWST must be drained in order to flood the reactor cavity to a sufficient
level for IVR. The IRWST contains two 20.3-cm (8") diameter recirculation lines that
provide paths for gravity draining (shown in Figure 21) [27]. Each recirculation line
contains one squib valve and one normally-open motor-operated valve in series [13]. The
IRWST is drained by manually opening the squib valves on the recirculation lines
(actuated from the control room). The recirculation lines inject into the recirculation
sumps at 90' (27.4 m) elevation [27].
4.2.2.2 RCS Inventory
Under normal operation, the RCS removes heat from the reactor core. In all the accident
scenarios that lead to the need for IVR, the RCS is assumed to be depressurized, resulting
in the containment (and thus the reactor cavity) being flooded up to at least the 83'
elevation with water from the RCS.
4.2.2.3 IVR Strategy Details
The IVR strategy entails preventing core melt from penetrating the reactor vessel by
passively removing heat from the outer surface of the reactor vessel with coolant in the
reactor cavity. In order for the IVR strategy to be employed the RCS must be
depressurized and the reactor cavity must be flooded to a sufficient level within a certain
timeframe.
The Emergency Response Guideline AFR.C-1 determines the functional restoration
guideline for the operator action to flood the reactor cavity. The specific operator
procedures are detailed in the REN-MAN03 operator action. One of the cavity flooding
lines is more restrictive than the other, so the worst case that is considered is the failure of
the less restrictive line, leaving only the more restrictive line to inject. In this case, the
cavity is flooded up to minimum level needed for IVR (98' elevation) within 65 minutes
of opening the valves. For IVR to be successful, the cavity must be flooded to this
minimum level within 70 minutes of a core-exit thermocouple reading of 12000 F (648.90
C).'3 Therefore, in order to guarantee that the reactor cavity will flood quickly enough,
the operator must open at least one of the two cavity flooding lines within five minutes of
a core-exit thermocouple reading of 12000 F [13]. The flooding timeline decision tree is
shown in Figure 24.
Timeline to Flood Reactor
Cavity after Core Exit No Line Failures 40 Minutes to Act
Thermocouples have
Exceeded 1200 degrees F (30 Minutes to Act)Failure of More Restrictive Line 20 Minutes to Act
(50 Minutes to Flood)
Failure of Less Restrictive Line 5 Minutes to Act5 Minutes to Act
(65 Minutes to Flood)
Figure 24: Flooding Timeline Decision Tree
A timeline of a typical core relocation event [13] requiring IVR and operator action is
shown in Figure 25. Included in the timeline is a general placement of the time when the
nanofluid valves must be opened. This time is dependent on how long the injection will
take and how long the concentrated nanofluid will take to mix with the water in the
cavity, as discussed next.
13 Such a temperature reading signals the onset of core damage and can be viewed as the start of the severe
accident.
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Figure 25: Accident Timeline for a Typical Core Relocation Event Requiring Operator Action
4.2.3 Design Comparison
Based upon the detailed system functions, the initial three design options described in
Section 4.1.2.3 can be compared in detail in three different areas: the time it takes to
inject the nanofluid, the promotion of mixing of the concentrated nanofluid with the
reactor cavity water, and the space limitation within containment.
4.2.3.1 Time Required to Inject the Nanofluid
In order to employ IVR successfully the coolant must be in the flooded reactor cavity
within 70 minutes after the core-exit thermocouples reach 12000 F. The nanofluid must
thus be in the flooded reactor cavity, in the vicinity of the reactor vessel lower head and
the insulation flow path 14 within this time frame. Each of the design options has a
different flow path from the nanofluid tanks to the reactor vessel lower head. The most
direct and quickest flow path is from the direct cavity injection (design option #1) in
which the concentrated nanofluid is injected at the desired location. The design that
injects the nanofluid into the IRWST recirculation lines (design option #2) is roughly the
same as the recirculation lines inject at the 90' elevation. The insulation flow path is
located between the 77' (23.5 m) elevation' 5 and the 98' elevation [13], so the direct
cavity injection would inject in roughly the same vicinity. The design that injects the
nanofluid into the IRWST has the potential to take much longer to inject into the cavity.
If operator action is not required to drain the IRWST (accident classes 3BL, 3BR, and
3C), then the flow path will be longer but the IRWST would be empty so the nanofluid
14 The flow path is defined in Section 2.1.
's 98' elevation minus 6.14 m downcomer height given in Table I.
injection should occur in roughly the same timeframe as the other design options. If
operator action to flood the IRWST is required (accident classes 3BE, 3D, and ID), then
the IRWST will be full and the tank could take up to 65 minutes to drain enough such
that the minimum flooding level for IVR (98' elevation) is reached. In the worst-case the
complete draining of the IRWST can take more than 100 minutes [13]. In the accident
scenarios that require operator action to drain the IRWST, nanofluid injection into the
IRWST will not result in the nanofluid being delivered to the reactor cavity in sufficient
time.
4.2.3.2 Nanofluid Mixing in the Reactor Cavity
In order to employ IVR successfully, the concentrated nanofluid must not only be
injected in sufficient time, but also must be sufficiently mixed with the water from the
RCS and IRWST to form the desired nanofluid concentration through the coolant in the
reactor cavity. Direct nanofluid injection into the cavity (design option #1) provides the
best mixing of the three design options because the injection line is equipped with
spargers at the injection point in the vicinity of the reactor vessel lower head. In addition
the injection point can be located in a location that promotes mixing. Determination of
the exact location that is optimal for mixing is beyond the scope the present study, but
could be examined with a computational fluid dynamic (CFD) approach in future work.
Injection into the IRWST recirculation lines (design option #2) is less effective because
the injection occurs into the recirculation sump at the 90' elevation. Injection into the
IRWST (design option #3) is equally effective at promoting mixing as the second design
option in accident scenarios that do not require the operator action to drain the IRWST.
This design option is less effective at promoting sufficient mixing in accident scenarios
that do require operator action to drain the IRWST as concentrated nanofluid will not
make it into the reactor cavity to mix with the RCS water in sufficient time.
4.2.3.3 Space Limitations within Containment
The containment in the AP1000 does have space limitations for the addition and
integration of additional equipment. In particular, the space between the outside of the
reactor vessel insulation and the reactor cavity wall is quite physically confined (i.e.,
roughly 10 cm). The design that injects the nanofluid directly into the cavity (design
option #1) is most restrained by the space limitations as the injection line and the spargers
will need to be placed between the outside of the reactor vessel insulation and the reactor
cavity wall. The design that injects the nanofluid into the IRWST recirculation lines
below the recirculation line valves (design option #2) is less restrained by space
limitations as the lines do not need to be placed between the outside of the reactor vessel
insulation and the reactor cavity wall. The design that injects the nanofluid into the
IRWST (design option #3) is the least constrained by the space limitations as the
nanofluid tanks and the IRWST are located above the crowded areas in the containment.
4.2.4 Design Selection
Table IX summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of each design option.
Table IX: Comparison of Design Options
Nanofluid Cavity
Space Requirements Time to Inject Mixing
Most restrictive space Promotes mixing in the
Direct Cavity Injection requirements (injection Fastest nanofluid cavity the best (due toDiesvign op ction #1) line located between(Design Option #1) vessel insulation and injection time spargers and injection
cavity wall) epoint location)
Somewhat restricted Promotes mixing in the
IRWST Recirculation space requirements Fast nanofluid injection cavity worse than direct
(nanofluid injection time (only slightly cavity injection
(Design tion #2) line must be connect slower than direct(Design Option #2) . (nanofluid injects intodownstream of cavity injection) sump at 90' elevation)recirculation valves)
Promotes mixing in the
Fast injection time if cavity as well as
IRWST is empty prior IRWST recirculation
IRWST Injection Least restrictive space to nanofluid injection; line injection if IRWST
slow injection time if is empty prior to(Design Option #3) requirements IRWST is manually nanofluid injection;
drained (too slow for poor mixing in cavity if
successful IVR) IRWST is manually
drained
Clearly nanofluid injection into the IRWST (design option #3) is eliminated because in
the accident sequences that require operator action to drain the IRWST, the concentrated
nanofluid will not be delivered to the reactor cavity in sufficient time to have successful
IVR. Injecting the nanofluid directly into the cavity (design option #1) is preferred to
injecting the nanofluid into the IRWST recirculation lines (design option #2) in terms of
promoting nanofluid mixing, but does have more restrictive space requirements for the
placement of the nanofluid injection line. Although the space limitations make
implementation of the direct cavity nanofluid injection more difficult, this design option
is preferred mainly because it is better at delivering the concentrated nanofluid close to
the reactor vessel lower head and promoting nanofluid mixing in the cavity.
4.3 Calculation of System Failure Probabilities
The reliability of the nanofluid injection system can be determined by analyzing how the
individual components of the system are connected and how the components will fail
through fault trees. Event trees elucidate the connections between the individual
components during different accident scenarios, while fault trees examine the factors that
lead to component failure and assign appropriate probabilities.
4.3.1 Event Trees
The event trees that involve nanofluid injection for IVR can be simplified and divided
into two categories: those for the accident sequences that require operator action to flood
the reactor cavity and those for the ones that do not.
4.3.1.1 Accident Sequences that require Operator Action to Flood
The accident sequences that require operator action to flood are in the accident classes
3B, 3D, and lD. A simplified event tree for accident class 3BE is shown in Figure 26
and accident class 3D/1D is shown in Figure 27. These event trees show that if the
operator fails to recognize the need to flood then the reactor cavity will not flood
sufficiently and the nanofluid will not inject effectively because both of these actions
require an operator action for these accident sequences. The nanofluid injection system is
design such that the operator action to flood the reactor cavity with water will be tied to
the operator action to inject the nanofluid either procedurally or electronically. The
failure of the operator to recognize the need to flood will lead to a likely vessel breach.
This end-state is labeled as a "likely vessel breach" because although core damage will
occur, it is possible for the water in the core and any water in the reactor cavity to prevent
the core from relocating and breaching the vessel, respectively. Similarly, if the reactor
cavity fails to flood sufficiently a vessel breach is likely. If the reactor cavity is
sufficiently flooded but the nanofluid is not effectively injected then natural circulation
heat removal through the vessel insulation flow path will occur with water as the coolant.
These event trees assume that the AP1000 has been uprated to take advantage of the
enhanced CHF properties of the nanofluid; therefore, heat removal with water as the
coolant would not be able to ensure that the vessel would not be breached, thus the end-
state labeled "possible vessel breach." The uprated AP1000 would require the successful
injection of nanofluid (because the nanofluid would need to be the coolant) to ensure that
the vessel would not be breached.
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Figure 26: Simplified Event Tree for Accident Class 3BE
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Figure 27: Simplified Event Tree for Accident Class 3D/1D
4.3.1.2 Accident Sequences that do not require Operator Action to Flood
The accident sequences that do not require operator action to flood are in the accident
classes 3BL, 3BR, and 3C. A simplified event tree for accident class 3BL is shown in
Figure 28, accident class 3BR is shown in Figure 29, and accident class 3C is shown in
Figure 30. These event trees assume that even if the operator does not recognize the need
to flood, the progression of the accident will result in the flooding of the cavity and
natural circulation heat removal through the vessel insulation flow path will occur with
water as the coolant. Because these event trees assume an uprated design of the AP1000,
this sequence could result in a vessel breach. In order to ensure that the vessel is not
breached, the operator must recognize the need to inject the nanofluid and the nanofluid
must be effectively injected into the reactor cavity.
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Figure 28: Simplified Event Tree for Accident Class 3BL
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Figure 29: Simplified Event Tree for Accident Class 3BR
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Figure 30: Simplified Event Tree for Accident Class 3C
4.3.2 Fault Trees
The fault trees are used to determine the probabilities of the different events in the event
trees.
4.3.2.1 Sufficient Reactor Cavity Flooding
After the operator recognizes the need to inject and attempts to open the squib valves on
the IRWST recirculation lines, the successful flooding of the reactor cavity depends on at
least one of the two valves opening. The operator is assumed to have successfully
recognized the need to flood quickly enough such that opening either of the two lines will
result in sufficient reactor cavity flooding. From the AP1000 Probabilistic Risk
Assessment (AP1000 PRA), the failure probability of sufficient reactor cavity flooding
can be calculated. 16
t6 Taken from the IWF Fault Tree (Recirculation MOVs fail to open following core damage) [13]:
("Sufficient reactor cavity flooding" failure probability) = ("Recirculation MOVs fail to open following
core damage" failure probability) - ("Failure to open recirculation MOVs" failure probability).
4.3.2.2 Effective Nanofluid Injection
In order for the nanofluid to be effectively injected into the reactor cavity, the nanofluid
must be delivered into reactor cavity and sufficiently mixed with the IRWST and RCS
water without the nanoparticles agglomerating. The fault tree is shown in Figure 31.
[
Figure 31: Effective Nanofluid Injection Fault Tree
However, the design of the nanofluid injection system is such that sufficient mixing in
the reactor cavity will occur. In addition, the nanofluid is selected such that it will not
agglomerate in storage or upon being injected and diluted. The simplified fault tree
shown in Figure 32 also factors in the potential for a common cause failure.
Figure 32: Simplified Effective Nanofluid Injection Fault Tree
4.3.3 Calculations
The probability of the reactor cavity failing to flood sufficiently is calculated to be
4.5x10".1 7 The probability of the nanofluid failing to effectively inject is calculated to be
to be 4.4x10 3 as shown in Figure 33. The valve failure probabilities for the valves used
to manually flood the reactor cavity with water are assumed in the AP1000 PRA to be
5.00xl0 4 [13]. The common cause failure probability of those valves is assumed in the
AP1000 PRA to be 4.4x10 "3 [13]. The failure and common cause failure probabilities for
the nanofluid injection valves were assumed to be the same as manual flood failure
probabilities because the valves will have similar design and operating characteristics.
4AE-3
2.5E-7
5.0E-4 5.0E-4
Figure 33: Failure Probability of the Effective Injection of the Nanofluid into the Reactor Cavity
The failure probability of the operator recognizing the need to flood the reactor cavity by
draining the IRWST is given by the probability assigned to the REN-MAN03 Operator
Action, which is 3.40x10 -3 [13]. The failure probability of the operator recognizing the
need to inject the nanofluid into the reactor cavity when the IRWST does not need to be
manually drained is estimated as 3.40x 10-. The basis for this estimate is that the
operator will be required to respond in a similar manner to recognizing the need to
manually flood the cavity (the valve configurations and timeframe are similar).
Given these probabilities, the event success probabilities given an initiating event
associated with a core relocation severe accident are calculated to be 0.99 for both
categories of accident sequences. Figure 34 and Figure 35 show the calculation of these
failure probabilities for accident class requiring and not requiring operator action to flood
the reactor cavity, respectively. These success probabilities assume that the power of the
reactor has been uprated.
17 "Recirculation MOVs fail to open following core damage" failure probability = 7.9x10 "3 [13] and
"Failure to open recirculation MOVs" failure probability = 3.4x10-3 [13], therefore "Sufficient reactor
cavity flooding" failure probability = 7.9x10-3 - 3.4x10' = 4.5x 10 3 .
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Figure 34: Event Failure Probability when Operator Action to Flood is required
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Figure 35: Event Failure Probability when Operator Action to Flood is not required
These success probabilities can be compared to the success probabilities of IVR just
using water. In the accident classes that require operator action to flood, the success
probability is 0.992118 compared to 0.9878. In the accident classes that do not require
operator action to flood, the success probability is 1.0 compared to 0.9922. These
probabilities are summarized in Table X.
Table X: Success Probability Comparison
Success Probability withPrior Success Probability Nanofluid Injection System
Manual Flooding Required 0.9921 0.9878
Manual Flooding Not Required 1.0 0.9922
Adding the nanofluid injection system does not lead to a significant decrease in the
success probabilities for accident classes that do require manual flooding. This decrease
in the success probabilities is considered insignificant because in order get the overall
accident probability, the associated system failure probability19 would have to be
multiplied by the probability of an accident progressing to the point that IVR is required
(a very small probability). However, adding the nanofluid injection system does lead to a
"8 (1-3.4*10-4)*(1-4.5*10-3) = 0.9921
19 The associated system failure probabilities are equal to one minus the system success probability (listed
in Table X).
0.9878
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new failure mode for accident classes that do not require manual flooding (for an uprated
power reactor).
4.4 Summary of the Nanofluid Injection System Design
The proposed nanofluid injection system would take advantage of the enhanced CHF
properties of the nanofluid in order to provide a higher safety margin than the current
IVR strategy or, for given margin, enable IVR at higher core power. The preferred
injection system design consists of injecting a concentrated nanofluid from two nanofluid
storage tanks directly into the reactor cavity between the outside of the reactor vessel
insulation and the reactor cavity wall. This injection system would be able to integrate
into the AP1000's current systems without interfering with the current system functions.
In addition, this injection system has a reasonably high success rate of 0.99, comparable
to the success rate without the injection system. Finally, this system would not be
prohibitively expensive, with the materials costs being roughly $140,000.
Finding #2: The proposed nanofluid injection system can be implemented with
only a slight decrease in the overall PRA success probability.
5. REGULATORY IMPACT OF USING
NANOFLUIDS IN IN-VESSEL RETENTION
This chapter investigates the regulatory impact of using nanofluids in an ALWR as part
of the in-vessel retention severe accident mitigation strategy (IVR). Because the
enhancement properties of nanofluids currently contain atypically large uncertainties, this
chapter addresses: (1) what must be demonstrated to the NRC before a nanofluid
injection system can be approved as part of a severe accident mitigation strategy and (2)
how the NRC deals with large uncertainties when approving a new technology as part of
a severe accident mitigation strategy. This chapter also addresses (3) the issue of the
potential adverse health and environmental effects associated with the use of nanofluids
in IVR and (4) the adequacy of the current regulatory regimes for ensuring that the
implementation of the proposed nanofluid injection system will not endanger public
health or safety.
5.1 NRC Severe Accident Current Practices
When implementing a new technology in a nuclear power plant, the current practices of
the NRC are the primary source of information on what will be required for such an
implementation to be realized.
5.1.1 NRC Severe Accident Requirements
Severe accidents are defined as postulated accidents beyond the design basis of the plant
and were first addressed by the NRC as a response to the Three Mile Island Nuclear
Power Plant accident in 1979.
The NRC has developed guidance and goals for preventing and/or mitigating events that
are beyond the design basis of the plant. In order for a new nuclear power plant to
adequately address severe accident concerns, the NRC staff must review the design and
conclude that it is sufficiently safe, placing no undue risk to public health and safety.
This review is to use an approach that stresses deterministic engineering analyses and
judgment and is complemented with PRA [28]. The use of PRA is required for both the
design basis and severe accident analyses [29].
In addressing severe accidents, the NRC issued two qualitative safety goals and two
associated quantitative objectives. The two safety goals that were established are: (1)
individual members of the public should be provided a level of protection from the
consequences of nuclear power plant operation such that individuals bear no additional
risk to life and health and (2) societal risks to life and health from nuclear power plant
operation should be comparable to or less than the risks of generating electricity by viable
competing technologies and should not be a significant addition to other societal risks.
The two associated quantitative objectives are: (1) the risk to an average individual in the
vicinity of a nuclear power plant of a prompt fatality that might result from reactor
accidents should not exceed 0.1 percent of the sum of prompt fatality risks resulting from
other accidents to which members of the United States population are generally exposed
and (2) the risk to the population in the area near a nuclear power plant of cancer
fatalities that might result from nuclear power plant operation should not exceed 0.1
percent of the sum of cancer fatality risks resulting from all other causes [30].
5.1.2 NRC IVR Assessment
The NRC has reviewed the IVR analysis for both the AP600 design and its successor, the
AP1000 design. In both of these designs, water from the IRWST is used as the reactor
vessel coolant. The IVR analysis for the current AP1000 design, the substance of which
has been approved by the NRC, provides a baseline for what the NRC views as a
sufficient demonstration of safety for IVR.
5.1.2.1 AP1000 Design Documents
An analysis of IVR is contained in the AP1000 design documents that Westinghouse
Electric Company has submitted to the NRC for review. These design documents include
the AP1000 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (AP1000 PRA), the AP1000 Design Control
Document (AP1000 DCD), and the APl000 Final Safety Evaluation Report (AP1000
FSER).
This analysis provides a safety margin that the NRC found acceptable for IVR when
using water as the coolant. In addition this analysis includes calculations of the core melt
progression and the structural integrity of the reactor vessel and insulation.
5.1.2.2 Severe Accident Management Guidelines
Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) are also required by the NRC.
SAMGs contain the procedures that operators rely on in the case of a severe accident.
The AP1000 Emergency Response Guidelines contain these procedures. These
procedures would be largely unchanged with the proposed addition of a nanofluid
injection system. An instruction to ensure nanofluid injection would need to be included
with the instruction to manually flood the reactor cavity (REN-MAN03). In addition, for
the accident sequences that do not require a manual flood of the reactor cavity, an
instruction to inject the nanofluid would have to be added.
5.1.2.3 Uncertainties Associated with the Use of Nanofluids
The IVR analysis using water as the coolant is not entirely applicable to IVR using a
nanofluid as the coolant. The properties of a nanofluid are not as stable and well-known
as the properties of water; the use of nanofluids in IVR contains significantly larger
uncertainties. Although PRA can be employed in a similar fashion with a nanofluid
coolant analysis as with a water coolant analysis (as was done in Section 4.3), more
deterministic assumptions underlie the nanofluid-based analysis.
The three key uncertainties that apply to the use of nanofluids in IVR that do not apply to
the water-based analysis are: (1) the amount of CHF enhancement the nanofluid can
provide in the IVR geometry and environment, (2) the stability of the nanofluid when
used in the proposed nanofluid injection system, and (3) the manner in which the
concentrated nanofluid mixes with the water in the flooded reactor cavity, and (4) the
properties of the nanofluids (i.e., particle size, shape, and loading).
These uncertainties need to be greatly reduced before a nanofluid coolant IVR system
could be considered as reliable as a water coolant IVR system. A successful
demonstration on par with the UCSB facility experiments (described in Chapter 2), but
using nanofluids, would address the first key uncertainty. In order to address the second
and third key uncertainties, additional features would have to be added to the experiment.
The nanofluid would have to be injected into water with the actual chemical composition
that would exist in the flooded reactor cavity. In addition, experiments would have to be
run for a longer amount of time than in the UCSB facility experiments. These features
would address the second key uncertainty. To address the third key uncertainty, more
than just a hemispherical slice as a test section as in the UCSB facility would be required.
The reactor cavity would have to be simulated and at least a half-hemisphere test section
would likely be needed to properly capture the nanofluid mixing effects. A computation
fluid dynamic model would aid in the design and reduce the third key uncertainty, but not
to the degree that direct experimental verification would.
Recommendation #1: Nanofluid CHF enhancement must be experimentally
verified for prototypical IVR geometry and conditions.
The fourth key uncertainty is somewhat different from the previous three key
uncertainties in that the uncertainties can be reduced by practices taken after installation
of the nanofluid injection system, as opposed to by experimental verifications conducted
prior to installation. The properties of the nanofluid in the storage tanks can be ensured
to be in the proper ranges such that CHF enhancement will be possible after injection
through periodic sampling of the nanofluid. Nanofluid properties have been observed to
remain constant over a period of months. Given that most nuclear power plants shut
down to refuel every 18 months, it is proposed that the nanofluid in the nanofluid storage
tanks be sampled during every refueling outage. These samples would then be used to
measure the properties of nanofluid in the nanofluid storage tank in order to ensure that
the properties are in the appropriate ranges. This sampling could be incorporated into the
maintenance procedures of the plant.
Recommendation #2: Sample and measure the properties of the nanofluid in the
storage tanks at least during every refueling outage.
5.1.3 NRC Case Studies
These case studies illustrate the policies and actions of the NRC when the NRC was
previously faced with the implementation of a new technology in a nuclear power plant.
From these past actions one can predict to an extent how the NRC will treat the
implementation of another new technology such as using nanofluids in IVR.
5.1.3.1 Replacement of Analog Technologies with Digital Technologies in
Nuclear Power Plants
Background
The original nuclear power plant designs approved by the NRC contained all analog
systems. As the plants aged and digital technology advanced, interest in digital
technologies increased: "the age-related degradation of some earlier analog electronic
systems and the difficulties in obtaining qualified replacement components for those
systems, as well as a desire for enhanced features such as automatic self-test and
diagnostics, greater flexibility, and increased data availability have prompted some
operating reactor licensees to replace existing analog systems with digital systems" [31].
Replacing analog systems with digital ones raised concerns with the NRC staff:
"The concerns of the staff stem from the design characteristics specific to the new
digital electronics that could result in failure modes and system malfunctions that
either were not considered during the initial plant design or may not have been
evaluated in sufficient detail in the safety analysis report. These concerns include
potential common mode failures due to (1) the use of common software in
redundant channels, (2) increased sensitivity to the effects of electromagnetic
interference, (3) the improper use and control of equipment used to control and
modify software and hardware configurations, (4) the effect that some digital
designs have on diverse trip functions, (5) improper system integration, and (6)
inappropriate commercial dedication of digital electronics" [31 ].
With the increased use of PRA in NRC decision-making, the NRC staff later raised
additional concerns with the proper way to model digital systems in PRAs.
NRC Actions and Policies
In light of the pending necessity of analog-to-digital upgrades in nuclear power plants,
the NRC commissioned Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to produce the report,
"The Programmable Logic Controller and Its Application in Nuclear Reactor Systems
[33]," which was issued in 1993. The initial NRC policy issued in a 1992 draft generic
letter published in the Federal Register20 was to review virtually all digital upgrades as
"essentially all safety-related digital replacements result in an unreviewed safety question
because of the possibility of the creation of a different type of malfunction than those
evaluated previously in the safety analysis report" [31].
In 1994, the NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards recommended that the
NRC commission a study to investigate the use of digital systems in nuclear power
plants. Subsequently the NRC commissioned a study by the National Academy of
Science (NAS) to investigate this subject [34]. Concurrently with the development of the
NAS study, the NRC reviewed the findings of available reports and revised its policy,
allowing the use of a 1993 NUMARC/EPRI Report [35] "as acceptable guidance for
determining when an analog-to-digital replacement can be performed without prior NRC
staff approval under the requirements of Section 50.59 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR 50.59)" [31]. In addition, the NRC initiated a revision of Chapter 7
(Instrumentation & Controls) of the Standard Review Plan [34].
In 1995, the NRC issued the policy statement encouraging greater use of PRA to
"improve safety decision making and improve regulatory efficiency" [34]. In response to
this emphasis on PRA, the NRC commissioned Ohio State University to produce the
report, "Current State of Reliability Modeling Methodologies for Digital Systems and
Their Acceptance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plant Assessments" [34], which was issued
in 2006. This report was intended "to provide technical support for the development of
regulatory guidance for risk-informing digital systems and guidance on the best
approaches for the development of a tool to support independent evaluation of the risk
associated with the use of digital systems in commercial nuclear power plants" [34].
General Applicability of this Case Study
It should be noted that digital systems are used (1) in normal plant operation, (2) to
mitigate design-basis accidents, and (3) to mitigate severe accidents. Most of the listed
NRC actions and policies were implemented for the first two uses of digital systems;
however, general lessons are still applicable to severe accident mitigation. This case
study illustrates that the NRC is very conservative when approving design changes that
contain significant uncertainties. It also illustrates that once relevant reports have been
developed and reviewed, the NRC will change its policies accordingly.
20 This draft generic letter was issued for public comment in the Federal Register (57FR36680) on August
14, 1992 [34].
5.1.3.2 Assessment of Active and Passive Systems in Nuclear Power Plants
Background
Passive systems and components are defined as those systems or components that do not
require external input and especially energy to operate [34]. Passive systems can be
divided into four categories: (1) physical barriers and static structures (e.g., structural
through material selection, condition, design and geometrical arrangement), (2) moving
working fluids (e.g., by fluid/gas movement, by phase changes, by chemical reactions
and/or by neutron flux effects), (3) moving mechanical parts (e.g., spring loaded check-
valves opening based on pressure difference), and (4) external signals and stored energy
(e.g., passive execution / active actuation) [37].
ALWR designs rely significantly more on passive systems than previous reactor designs.
Passive systems have been implemented because of their perceived increased safety and
their perceived lower cost [36]. The aim of passive systems is to increase safety by
reducing human error and active component malfunctions [37]. Passive systems based
on thermal hydraulics typically contain large uncertainties that are "difficult to quantify
due to the fact that not all important factors may have been identified and there is no
common agreement about calculating principles" [37].
NRC Actions and Policies
The underlying NRC policy regarding the assessment of passive safety systems in the
licensing of new reactors is contained in Title 10, Part 52 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) [28]. This section of the CFR states that passive safety systems will
be approved if:
(1) The performance of each safety feature of the design has been demonstrated
through either analysis, appropriate test programs, experience, or a combination
thereof;
(2) Interdependent effects among the safety features of the design have been
found acceptable by analysis, appropriate test programs, experience, or a
combination thereof;
(3) Sufficient data exist on the safety features of the design to assess the analytical
tools used for safety analyses over a sufficient range of normal operating
conditions, transient conditions, and specified accident sequences, including
equilibrium core conditions; and
(4) The scope of the design is complete except for site-specific elements such as
the service water intake structure and the ultimate heat sink [28].
Alternatively, passive safety systems can be approved if "there has been acceptable
testing of an appropriately sited, full-size, prototype of the design over a sufficient range
of normal operating conditions, transient conditions, and specified accident sequences,
including equilibrium core conditions" [28].
How these standards have been employed in practice for severe accidents can be seen in
what the NRC found acceptable in the Westinghouse AP1000 design. For the passive
features used as part of IVR, analysis and experimental results (but not of a full-size
design) were used. These features were generally not assigned failure probabilities as
active components were, but instead were analyzed in a deterministic fashion with an
appropriate safety margin. Additionally, many passive safety systems are not required to
be tested as active components are, simply because such testing of passive systems is
either not applicable or not feasible. For example, natural circulation loops used to
mitigate severe accidents cannot be tested after installation the same way that MOVs can
be tested.
General Applicability of this Case Study
This case study illustrates that when assessing passive safety systems the NRC typically
requires in-depth analysis and experimental verification (if reasonably possible) before it
will have enough confidence to integrate these systems into the overall design PRA.
Furthermore, the NRC requires a larger safety margin for passive safety systems, the
larger uncertainties present, preferring to err of the side of precaution. The NRC attempts
to reduce any uncertainties associated with passive safety systems upfront, as they
generally cannot be tested after installation in the manner that active systems can be.
5.2 Nanofluid Health and Environmental Hazards
In addition to investigating the potential adverse effects of using a nanofluid as a coolant
in IVR, the potential adverse health and environmental effects resulting directly from the
nanofluid need to be investigated.
5.2.1 Regulation of Nanofluids
Currently nanofluids and other nanomaterials are not specifically regulated for safety by
the federal government. Nanomaterials are regulated based upon the properties of their
bulk constituents even though it is the details of their composition that make them more
useful and potentially more hazardous. As a result, occupational regulations are typically
set for larger size particles and are too lax for nanoparticles [39]. It is also unclear how
nanomaterials will ultimately be regulated. The two federal acts that will have
jurisdiction over nanomaterials are the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) and the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHAct), with the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and the Occupational Health and Safety Administration
(OSHA) being the primary regulators.
5.2.1.1 The Toxic Substances Control Act
If nanomaterials are new chemicals then they would have to meet the definition of a
"chemical substance" as defined in TSCA [40]. Section 2 of TSCA states that EPA can
regulate "chemical substances and mixtures which present an unreasonable risk of injury
to health or the environment" [40]. Section 3 of TSCA defines a "chemical substance" as
"any organic or inorganic substance of a particular molecular identity" [40]. A "mixture"
is defined as "any combination of two or more chemical substances if the combination
does not occur in nature and is not, in whole or in part, the result of a chemical reaction"
[40]. EPA under section 6(a) of TSCA clearly could regulate nanofluids either as a
"chemical substance" or a "mixture" if they presented "an unreasonable risk of injury to
health or the environment."
Section 5(a) of TSCA requires a manufacturer to file a Premanufacture Notification
(PMN) with EPA if the "chemical substance" is "new" or is put to a "significant new
use" [40]. A PMN allows EPA to review the health and environmental risks of a
"chemical substance" before manufacturing begins. However, "if a company has no
toxicity data for a given chemical, the manufacturer is only required to submit data that
already exists elsewhere, or may simply rely on information for chemicals that are
structurally analogous to the one being reviewed" [41]. Nanomaterials are generally
considered by manufacturers to be variations of the bulk material (and thus not a "new
chemical substance") and thus manufacturers have not been submitting a PMN to EPA.
Even if the manufacturer does deem that a nanomaterial is "new" or that it is being put to
a "significant new use," currently "no mechanism exists to prevent a manufacturer from
simply extrapolating toxicity information from the bulk-sized toxicity data on file" [41]
when filing a PMN. Thus, a potentially hazardous nanoparticle with a safe bulk material
would not be safely regulated through the PMN requirement.21
While a PMN does not require the manufacturer to conduct toxicity tests, section 4 of
TSCA allows EPA to "require that manufacturers generate new test data in the face of
unreasonable risk or substantial human exposure" [41]. If in the future tests began to
show that nanomaterials were toxic, further toxicity testing could be required by EPA
under section 4 of TSCA.
5.2.1.2 The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
The "general duty clause" contained in section 5(a) of the OSHAct states that each
employer "furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment
which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or
serious physical harm to his employees" and that each employer "shall comply with
occupational safety and health standards promulgated under this Act" [42]. Section 6(b)
of the OSHAct states that standards promulgated under the OSHAct should assure that
"no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity" [42]. If
21 See Section 5.2.2.1 for examples.
nanomaterials become a "recognized hazard" then they clearly can be regulated by
OSHA under the OSHAct. To date, however, OSHA has not promulgated any
nanomaterial-specfic rules or Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs) [41].
The Hazard Communication Standard (HCS) is an important standard promulgated by
OSHA under the OSHAct that while not specific to nanomaterials does apply to them.
The HCS ensures "that the hazards of all chemicals produced or imported are evaluated,
and that information concerning their hazards is transmitted to employers and
employees" [41]. A full transmittal of hazard information is to be accomplished by
"labeling, a Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS), and employee training" [41]. The
hazard information for nanomaterials, however, is currently still based on the bulk
material if it is available at all. For example, the MSDS for Nyacol alumina nanofluid
lists all toxicological and ecological information as either "not available" or "none
reported" [15].
5.2.1.3 Safety Guidelines
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), a branch of the
United States Department of Health and Human Services, has issued only general safety
guidelines:
Workers within nanotechnology-related industries have the potential to be
exposed to uniquely engineered materials with novel sizes, shapes and physical
and chemical properties, at levels far exceeding ambient concentrations. To
understand the impact of these exposures on health, and how best to devise
appropriate exposure monitoring and control strategies, much research is still
needed. Until a clearer picture emerges, the limited evidence available would
suggest caution when potential exposures to nanoparticles may occur [43].
Safety guidelines issued by smaller non-governmental organizations are not any more
specific. For example, the MIT Environment, Health, and Safety Office states:
There are currently no government occupational exposure standards for
nanomaterials. When they are eventually developed, different standards for
different types of nanomaterials will be needed. One should also be aware that
Material Safety Data Sheets may not have accurate information at this point in
time [44].
5.2.2 Health and Environmental Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is a useful tool for evaluating health and environmental hazards, even
when large uncertainties allow for only a qualitative assessment. A basic framework that
is commonly used for risk assessment was developed in a study by the United States
National Academy of Sciences [45]. The four stages of this framework are: (1) hazard
identification, (2) dose-response assessment, (3) exposure assessment, and (4) risk
characterization.
5.2.2.1 Hazard Identification
The first stage of analysis is hazard identification, which is the process of determining if a
substance is "casually linked to particular health effects" [46]. Hazard identification is
used the environmental context to identify if a substance casually linked to adverse
environmental effects.
Health
The causal links to adverse health effects are determined by examining the toxicological
properties of the substance, usually focusing on test results in animals or other test
organisms. In general, a toxic substance can enter the body via any of three pathways:
through inhalation, by ingestion, or by contact with the skin [46]. Of the three pathways
into the body, the inhalation and dermal (contact with skin) pathways are likely of most
concern for the handling of nanofluids.
The Health and Safety Commission in the United Kingdom (UK HSC) issued a report in
2004 stating:
There is some evidence that dermal exposure to nanoparticles may lead to direct
penetration of nanoparticles into the epidermis and possibly beyond into the blood
stream. Therefore, it may be necessary to introduce control to exclude or limit the
level of dermal exposure likely to occur.
No published literature has been identified which has investigated the
effectiveness of skin protective equipment (suits and gloves) effectiveness to
prevent dermal exposure. It is unlikely that it will be more effective against
nanoparticles than against larger particles. It is conceivable that for many current
forms of skin protective equipment, nanoparticles could penetrate directly under
certain conditions [47].
Additionally, the UK HSC warns that "if there is retention in hair follicles, there could be
an enhanced potential for systemic availability of leachates from nanoparticles compared
with micrometer particles" [47].
Once in the body, either by contact with the skin or more directly by inhalation,
nanoparticles can readily enter the bloodstream and may be able to pass through the
blood-brain barrier or blood placenta barrier" [39,48,49]. Once in the bloodstream
nanoparticles have the potential to have adverse effects on humans that would not occur
with chemically identical substances made up of larger particles. A report by Swiss
Reinsurance Company, the global reinsurance and risk management firm, notes that "as
size decreases and reactivity increases, harmful effects may be intensified, and normally
harmless substances may assume hazardous characteristics" [39]. The potentially
harmful effects of nanoparticles speculated based on the nanoparticle's increased
reactivity (due to the larger surface area per unit volume) and the nanoparticle's
accessibility to regions of the body that larger particles are excluded from. Although
nanoparticle toxicity is not well-studied, there are some studies that suggest potential
adverse health effects. For example, "nanoparticles such as metals and metal oxides (Cu,
Co, TiO2, and SiO2) have also been shown to have inflammatory [50,51] and toxic [52]
effects on cells" [53]. Another study found that Teflon inhalation "correlated well with
surface area per mass," with the Teflon nanoparticle inhalation being much more toxic
than inhalation of larger particles [54]. There has been little research conducted on the
carcinogenicity of nanoparticles to date, but this type of research is vital to characterizing
the hazard that nanofluids pose as it is believed that for carcinogens there may be "no
threshold dose below which the risk is zero" [46]. The latent effect problem further
complicates matters by making evidence for carcinogenicity difficult to obtain for new
substances.
The personal protective equipment (PPE) that workers are currently required to wear in
containment (where the exposure to nanofluids would occur) typically includes coveralls,
shoe covers, gloves, and masks. When handling penetrating radioactive nuclear species
(e.g., tritium), supplied-air respirators and supplied-air suits are often worn [55].
Wearing the proper PPE would appear to be sufficient to greatly reduce the amount of (if
not prevent) inhalation and dermal exposure. The nanofluid would additionally be
contained in sealed tanks during normal operation of the plant further reducing any
chance of contact. It must be noted that casual linkages between nanofluids and adverse
health effects are largely speculative at this time due to the lack of scientific data.
Environment
Nanoparticles could also have adverse environmental effects, such as aiding the transport
of pollutants by bonding with them [39]. Nanoparticles could also be absorbed by plants
that are ingested by humans or other animals [39]. It must again be noted that casual
linkages between nanofluids and adverse environmental effects are speculative at this
time due to the lack of scientific data. These adverse environmental hazards are very
unlikely to be significant for the use of nanofluids in IVR because of the containment
structure. The fact that the proposed nanofluid injection system is located within
containment will prevent any nanofluid from coming into contact with the outside
environment.
5.2.2.2 Dose-Response Assessment
The second stage of analysis is dose-response assessment, which is "the process of
characterizing the relationship between the dose of an agent administered or received and
the incidence of an adverse health effect" [46]. Environmental effects are be similarly
characterized in this stage of analysis.
Health
At this stage "risk assessors determine significant levels of concentration, such as the
'lowest observable adverse effect level' (LOAEL) and the 'no observable adverse effect
level' (NOAEL) for health assessment" [56]. Other relationships that must be
determined are "whether the response is carcinogenic (cancer causing) or non-
carcinogenic and whether the experiment is a one-time acute test or a long-term chronic
test" [46]. Determining the NOAEL and LOAEL for nanofluids is very difficult at this
point because of the scarcity of testing on humans or animals and the possible latent
adverse health effects. Again it should be noted that NOAEL is believed to be zero for
carcinogens.
Environment
For environmental assessments the dose-response stage of analysis involves determining
"the 'predicted no-effect concentration' (PNEC)" [56]. Determining the PNEC for
nanofluids is also very difficult at this point because of the scarcity of testing. It should
be noted, however, that for the postulated adverse environmental effect of aiding the
transport of pollutants, the PNEC would have to be higher than the PNEC for absorption
by plants because the former is a bulk process, while the latter is potentially subject such
phenomena as bioaccumulation in the food chain [57].
5.2.2.3 Exposure Assessment
The third stage of analysis is the exposure assessment, in which an estimate is made of
the "dose or concentration of the substance to which a population is or may be exposed
and the size of the population exposed" [56]. The extent to which the environment is
exposed to a substance is also estimated in this stage of analysis.
Health
The number of people exposed to nanofluids in IVR is very limited. The exposure is
limited to the maintenance workers who fill and check the contents of the nanofluid
storage tanks. Checking the contents of the tanks involves taking a small sample of the
nanofluid for analysis and checking the tank level. This maintenance action would only
need to be conducted during refueling outages, which occur approximately once every 18
months. The tanks would need to be filled less frequently than the maintenance actions.
No exposure after the deployment of the nanofluid injection system (i.e., cleanup) needs
to be considered because in the case of a severe accident the containment structure would
be permanently sealed off from the outside environment. Even in the exceedingly rare
event of a large release of radioactive material from containment (with a frequency of
5x10-7 per reactor year [12]), the health and environmental consequences would be
negligible compared to the consequences of the fission product release.
Environment
For environmental assessments, estimates are made of "the concentration of the substance
that will eventually be found in the environment" [56]. This concentration is known as
"the 'predicted environmental concentration' (PEC)" [56]. The PEC for nanofluids used
in IVR should be negligible as they are to be used in relatively small quantities (i.e.,
~1000 L of 20% by weight alumina nanofluid per reactor) within the containment
structure.
5.2.2.4 Risk Characterization
The fourth and final step of analysis is risk characterization. This determination involves
estimating the "likelihood that the examined substance will adversely affect human health
or the environment, and the severity of the anticipated negative effects" [56]. This
determination is what "should be used as a basis for legal and policy decision-making"
[56].
Health
Although there are large uncertainties in the extent of the hazard and the dose that would
produce adverse health effects, the extremely small amount of exposure is much more
certain. The very small fraction of the population that would be exposed, the very limited
time that they would be exposed, and the fact that anyone exposed would be wearing PPE
makes the potential health risks associated with the use of nanofluids extremely low even
factoring in the large uncertainties. The one health hazard to be potentially concerned
with at these low dose levels is carcinogenicity.
Environment
Because of the extremely small exposures associated with this proposed use of nanofluids
and the fact that the nanofluids will remain within the containment structure, makes the
environmental risk negligible.
5.2.3 Health and Environmental Risk Management
After the risk assessment is completed, the determinations from the risk characterization
can be used to make recommendations for how to manage the health and environmental
risks. The health and environmental risk characterization (Section 5.2.2.4), states that the
despite significant uncertainties, the health and environmental risks remain low because
of the low dose and exposure levels. However, because the amount of available health
and environmental data will greatly increase with the large amount of research that is
currently being conducted (as detailed in Section 5.2.4), unforeseen health and
environmental concerns could emerge. Of particular concern are long-term latent and no-
threshold risks, such as certain types of cancer. Due to these factors, a periodic review of
relevant nanomaterial research should be conducted to identify any heightened health or
environmental concerns. A periodic review cycle of once every 12 months is proposed.
This review frequency is consistent with the standard review frequency used in TSCA
[40].
Recommendation #3: Health and environmental risks of the use of nanofluids in
IVR should be reevaluated every 12 months.
5.2.4 Research on the Health and Environmental Effects of
Nanomaterials
In order to reduce the uncertainties associated with the adverse health and environmental
effects of nanoparticles, much research is currently being conducted. The 21st Century
Nanotechnology Research and Development Act, passed by Congress in 2003,
"formalized the preexisting bureaucratic arrangement under the less formal National
Nanotechnology Initiative, established research centers, and appropriated the necessary
funds" [41]. In fiscal year 2006, the funding request for nanotechnology research and
development totaled $1.054 billion for 11 agencies, with approximately $81 million
being allocated for research on the health and environmental aspects of nanomaterials
[41]. For example, "the Department of Defense will spend $5.5 million developing a
computer model that predicts whether nanostructures are toxic" [58], "EPA requested $5
million in 2005 to fund studies on the toxicity of nanomaterials and their reaction while
in transport" [58], and "the National Toxicology Program launched a five-year $3 million
project to assess the toxic and carcinogenic potential of nanoparticles" [58]. More
generally, "additional toxicology testing is being funded or planned by the National
Science Foundation (NSF), the National Toxicology Program, and other research
organizations in the US and in Europe" [44].
Because the toxicity of nanomaterials is highly dependent on the bulk material, its
structure, and the type of exposure, toxicity research on the specific nanomaterial in
question will be the most applicable. Nanofluids of the type proposed for use in IVR are
unlikely to generate much public agency interest in toxicity research because they are not
nearly as widespread as other nanomaterials. As stated in the risk characterization
(Section 5.2.2.4), despite the large associated uncertainties, the total health and
environmental risks will be low. Unless the periodic review finds research indicating a
heightened concern for the health or environmental risks at the low dose levels associated
with nanofluids use in IVR, toxicity research specifically on nanofluids used in IVR does
not seem necessary. However, if the periodic review does find a heightened health or
environmental concern, then specific research should be conducted.
Recommendation #4: If the periodic review finds a heightened concern, specific
research should be conducted on the health and/or environmental effects of
nanofluids.
5.3 Frameworks for Managing Large Uncertainties
Most decisions must be made with some amount of uncertainty. Decisions made with
large amounts of uncertainty are typically very difficult to make. In the face of such
large uncertainties (such as those associated with the use of nanofluids in IVR),
frameworks are useful in determining how best to manage these large uncertainties.
5.3.1 Precautionary Principle vs. Proof Before Action Framework
The first framework classifies risk management strategies into abiding by either the
precautionary principle (PP) or by proof before action (PBA). When dealing with large
uncertainties, two types of errors are possible. Figure 36 illustrates these competing
risks, the classification of which was first developed to analyze the Food and Drug
Administration's drug approval process [59].
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Figure 36: Regulatory Decision-Making under Uncertainty22
22 Adapted from [59].
Figure 36 underlies this framework, with the PP proponents favoring the avoidance of
Type II errors and PBA proponents favoring the avoidance of Type I errors. Type I
errors can be described as avoiding false positives, while Type II errors can be described
as avoiding false negatives.
5.3.1.1 Precautionary Principle
PP proponents argue that "the precautionary principle demands the proactive introduction
of protective measures in the face of possible risks, which science at present - in the
absence of knowledge - can neither confirm nor reject" [39]. Furthermore, risk should
generally be shielded in order to correct for bias for under-protection. This bias, PP
proponents argue, results from industry incentives for down-playing risks and the fact
that the scientific review process leads to a bias for false negatives. This risk shielding
serves to avoid the ultimate costs of irreversible harms [60]. Finally, PP proponents
argue that more irreversible harm (caused directly by the action in question) will result
from focusing on protecting against Type I errors than from focusing on protecting
against Type II errors.
5.3.1.2 Proof Before Action
PBA proponents argue potentially unsafe activities should be regulated only after these
activities have been proven to in fact be unsafe. Furthermore, risk should be shielded less
in order to correct for the bias for over-protection. PBA proponents base their claim on
the fact that retrospective studies have found exaggerated risks (such as food irradiation).
This bias for over-protection is the result of the incentives for non-governmental
organizations, courts, and the government to over-state risks and the fact that mass
perceptions and fear create a bias for false positives. This risk management strategy
avoids the direct and opportunity costs associated with regulation [61]. Finally, PBA
proponents argue that more irreversible harm (caused by lock-in preventing a publicly
beneficial action from being allowed) will result from focusing on protecting against
Type II errors than from focusing on protecting against Type I errors.
5.3.1.3 Application of the PP vs. PBA Framework to Nanofluids
With regard to nanomaterials, some groups are invoking the use of PP by calling for a
"moratorium [on the use ofnanomaterials] until the scientific uncertainties surrounding
the risks are clarified" [58]. However, currently the United States and most countries
around the world are abiding by PBA, as nanomaterials are not specifically regulated by
any federal agencies.
Whether the precautionary principle or proof before action should be applied is
dependent on the details of the activity in consideration. When analyzing the use of
nanofluids in IVR, two risk categories emerge: (1) the risk of the nanofluid not mitigating
a severe accident as designed and (2) the health and environmental risk from exposure to
the nanofluid.
The first category involves a large irreversible potential consequence if allowed in its
current knowledge state. If temporarily restricted, the potential for lock-in and the
potential unrealized benefits are a much smaller and much more reversible consequence.
Based on the relative reversibilities and consequences, the use of PP seems to be more
prudent than PBA with the current state of knowledge for the first risk category.
However, if the uncertainties associated with this risk category could be greatly reduced
and the nanofluid injection system is still shown to be effective, then the benefits could
outweigh the risks such that the using nanofluids in IVR would be more prudent.
The second category (health and environmental risk from exposure to nanofluids)
involves a multitude of consequences, with varying levels of severity and reversibility.
Most of the postulated potential health effects would not result in permanent damage and
would thus be considered reversible. However, other postulated potential adverse health
and environmental effects would be irreversible. Because of these potential irreversible
adverse effects, use of PP seems more appropriate with the current state of knowledge.
5.3.2 Observability vs. Controllability Framework
M. Granger Morgan, the risk management expert and professor at Carnegie Mellon
University, proposed another way to assess risk, based on where the risk falls on the
observablity-controllablity matrix [62].
5.3.2.1 Observability-Controllability Matrix
With the observablity-controllablity matrix, risks are placed in one of four quadrants as
shown in Figure 37.
%4OW TO THOSE EWOSED.
EFFCT A EDw NWRL
FMMBU.aMV 0 ClOIECE
caramom oaro c a owomnee n-
@R@1OpL.MG<LWI · r ·aM* l
oeTRYEADd4uO.uDanI CO(DASe
OmAIUOPmS.
WT FATAL * SIfATOLISWAMI %YAT ,CT,,I WW •:: . -
.. LO . TRACT
*"&V-
0 M C
*NTOiFRTI WID
* O'SON,.mNO PC
M1U
-nOAMWAMemAUTD MD~rnANOMMO.VZIM
*M
GEAIYimLPDl
rMECotH
wwuur
S Un•M4ON•TUMRt.ARY
NWLArUVRAPWO(0
MR
t"m
DWNTOTIHOE EPOGr[ OTr.M~u OS
•m,,iwm's•
Figure 37: General Observablity-Controllablity Matrix2
Risks viewed as uncontrollable are more likely to be regulated than risks viewed as
controllable. For example, the risks of using a trampoline are viewed as controllable
primarily because using a trampoline is a voluntary activity, individuals can easily
engage in safe practices that greatly reduce the risk, and the consequences of an accident
are generally reversible. In contrast, the storage and transport of liquefied natural gas is
viewed as uncontrollable as members of the public are involuntarily exposed to the
consequences of an accident, individuals cannot easily reduce this risk through safe
practices, and the consequences of an accident can be irreversible. Therefore, because of
the greater risk controllability associated with the use of trampolines, the risks associated
with the use of trampolines are less likely to be regulated than the risks associated with
storage and transport of liquefied natural gas.
Risks that are viewed as not being observable are more likely to be regulated than risks
viewed as observable. For example, the risks from riding a motorcycle are very well-
known to both experts and the individuals exposed to the risk (i.e., the rider). The
consequences of the risk are also known immediately with strong causation. In contrast,
the risks of pesticides are somewhat less well-known to experts, the consequences are not
known immediately, and the causation is often fairly weak (i.e., the long-term latent
biological and ecological effects). The individuals exposed to this risk are also generally
much less aware of their exposure and the potential consequences. Therefore, because of
23 Taken from [62].
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the greater risk observability associated with riding motorcycles, motorcycle risks are less
likely to be regulated than pesticide risks.
In the observablity-controllablity matrix, the risks that are most likely to be regulated are
in the upper-right quadrant (not observable and uncontrollable) and the risks that are least
likely to be regulated are in the lower-left quadrant (observable and controllable) [60].
When dealing with large uncertainties, the quadrants that are of interest are the upper
quadrants (not observable).
5.3.2.2 Application of the Observability vs. Controllability Framework to
Nanofluids
Dividing the risks of using of nanofluids in IVR into the two categories used in Section
5.3.2.1, we can analyze each category using the observability vs. controllability
framework. The placements of these two risks are shown in Figure 38. The risk of IVR
failure with water as a coolant is also shown in Figure 38.
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Figure 38: Nanofluid-specific Observablity-Controllablity Matrix
The nanofluid health and environmental risks are placed in the upper-left quadrant of the
observablity-controllablity matrix because these risks, while fairly controllable are
presently not observable. These risks are considered fairly controllable when used in
IVR because exposure is limited to workers who enter containment and can be easily
reduced by using the proper PPE. These risks, however, are not considered to be
observable primarily because of the large uncertainties associated with their potential
health and environmental hazards. Few, if any, relevant experiments have been
conducted that accurately assess these potential hazards.
The nanofluid coolant IVR risk is placed high in the upper-right quadrant of the
observablity-controllablity matrix because this risk is presently uncontrollable and not
observable. This risk is considered to be uncontrollable because the failure of IVR could
result in irreversible consequences, with some of those consequences being borne
involuntarily. Again, the large uncertainties result in this risk not being observable.
However, this risk is more observable than the nanofluid health and environmental risks
because there is some relevant experimental evidence of the CHF enhancement properties
of a nanofluid. The uncertainties are still much greater than when water is used as the
coolant, justifying the placement of the water coolant IVR risk well below the nanofluid
coolant IVR risk in the observablity-controllablity matrix.
Recommendations #1 and #2 would serve to move the nanofluid coolant IVR risk straight
down in the observablity-controllablity matrix, ideally as close to the water coolant IVR
risk as possible. Likewise, Recommendations #3 and #4 would serve to move the
nanofluid health and environmental risks downwards in the observablity-controllablity
matrix.
5.4 Adequacy of the Current Regulatory Regimes
Emerging technologies, including nanofluids, often do not fall readily into the existing
regulatory regimes. This section analyzes how well the use of nanofluids in IVR falls
into the existing regulatory regimes and makes recommendations for improving the
adequacy of the current regulatory regimes.
5.4.1 Regulatory Adequacy of Severe Accident Mitigation
As discussed in Section 5.1, the NRC has extensive regulatory requirements in place to
deal with the implementation of new technologies. Furthermore, taking the case study in
Section 5.1.3 as an example, the NRC has dealt with the regulation of an uncertain
technology before. NRC issues licenses to nuclear power plants after the NRC has
reviewed the specific plant design. Any changes to this design must be reviewed by the
NRC before implementation, giving the NRC ample opportunity to ensure continued
public health and safety.
Using the frameworks discussed in Section 5.3, one can analyze some aspects of how the
NRC treats uncertainty and assess the appropriateness of the approach. Taking the NRC
policies and actions in the case study as the prime examples, one can clearly see that the
NRC employs the precautionary principle, not approving the use of any new technology
until research has been conducted to sufficiently reduce the associated uncertainties.
Considering the high level of irreversible consequences associated with severe accident
risks, the precautionary principle seems to be the appropriate approach. Additionally,
considering that severe accident risks are in the upper-right quadrant of the observability-
controllability matrix, this high level of regulation seems entirely appropriate.
5.4.2 Regulatory Adequacy of Health and Environmental Hazard Control
As discussed in Section 5.2.1, nanomaterials can be regulated under TSCA and the
OSHAct, even though they have not been specifically regulated as nanomaterials to date.
The control of the potential health and environmental hazards has thus followed the risk
management strategy of proof before action. The health and environmental risks
associated with using nanofluids in IVR are in the upper-left quadrant of the
observability-controllability matrix. Because of the high level of controllability for this
nanofluid application, the proof before action strategy that the current regulatory regimes
implicitly utilize seems appropriate.24 The one caveat that needs to be noted is the
potential for irreversible health hazards to emerge in the future, shifting the health risk to
the right in the observability-controllability matrix. If this were to occur, the current
regulatory regimes might need to be changed.
Finding #3: The current regulatory regimes are adequate for ensuring that the
implementation of the proposed nanofluid injection system will not endanger
public health or safety.
24 While the current regulatory regime may be appropriate for this particular application, this is not
necessarily the case for other applications using nanomaterials.
6. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND
FUTURE WORK
The use of nanofluids as part of the IVR strategy in ALWRs presents both opportunities
to increase the safety margin and/or increase the reactor power as well as potential
difficulties with implementation in an actual nuclear power plant. These opportunities
and potential difficulties were investigated in this thesis. The associated findings are
summarized below.
The first finding is the result of the model that simulated the two-phase flow and heat
transfer on the reactor vessel outer surface and quantified the increase in residual power
that can be removed using a nanofluid (detailed in Chapters 2 and 3). The second finding
is the result of the analysis of the conceptual nanofluid injection system proposed in
Chapter 4. The third finding is the general conclusion of the legal analysis,
environmental and health risk assessment, uncertainty analysis, and case studies in
Chapter 5.
In addition to the three findings, the four recommendations, reiterated below, seek to
remedy some of the potential difficulties with using nanofluids in IVR.
Findings
1. Using a nanofluid as the coolant in IVR could allow a -40% increase in
the power compared to using water as a coolant, while maintaining the
same safety margin.
2. The proposed nanofluid injection system can be implemented with
only a slight decrease in the overall PRA success probability.
3. The current regulatory regimes are adequate for ensuring that the
implementation of the proposed nanofluid injection system will not
endanger public health or safety.
The first and second recommendations are aimed at significantly reducing the key
uncertainties associated with using nanofluids in IVR. These uncertainties, if not
addressed, would very likely prevent the NRC from approving the use of nanofluids in
nuclear safety systems. The third and fourth recommendations seek to ensure that public
health will not be endangered by the use of nanofluids in IVR by periodically reviewing
the risks and conducting more research if necessary.
Related future work includes:
* Experimental verification of the CHF performance of nanofluids at
prototypical IVR flow conditions and geometry
* Experimental study of the colloidal stability of nanofluids in the IVR chemical
and radiation environment
* CFD analysis and experimental verification of the mixing of the concentrated
nanofluid upon injection into the flooded reactor cavity
* Toxicity assessment of any nanofluids selected for use in IVR.
Recommendations
1. Nanofluid CHF enhancement must be experimentally verified for
prototypical IVR geometry and conditions.
2. Sample and measure the properties of the nanofluid in the storage
tanks at least during every refueling outage.
3. Health and environmental risks of the use of nanofluids in IVR should
be reevaluated every 12 months.
4. If the periodic review finds a heightened concern, specific research
should be conducted on the health and/or environmental effects of
nanofluids.
APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTAL PROOFS AND
CALCULATIONS
A.1 Verification of Power-Flow Curve Shape in Natural
Circulation
This proof assumes a very simplified version of the natural circulation loop that the
model simulates. This simplified version has a height of H, a power into the system of Q,
and a form loss with a form loss coefficient of K in the riser as shown in Figure 39. The
water is assumed to be saturated, with the riser in two-phase flow and the downcomer in
single-phase liquid flow.
Figure 39: Simplified Natural Circulation Loop
First the pressure loss versus mass flow rate curve for the system will be plotted for
different power levels. The form pressure loss, APo,,, , is the only pressure loss in this
system and is given by Equation (A.1) [3].
fom -p,
where: 2 = two-phase friction multiplier, K = form loss coefficient, A = riser cross-sectional area
(A.1)
--ý 0*
7j r
Since the water is assumed to be saturated throughout, the power of the system, Q, is
given by Equation (A.2).
Q = t hfg x (A.2)
By making the simplifying assumption that the flow is homogenous and in equilibrium
throughout (HEM), the two-phase friction multiplier, 02, is given by Equation (A.3) [3].
D2 -1+P f .x (A.3)
Pg
Equations (A.1), (A.2), and (A.3) can be combined to give an expression for the system
pressure loss, AP, shown in Equation (A.4).
K • P Q] h (A.4)AP = APfor,,,,m = 2Pf A2  h2+ (A.4)
Equation (A.4) is plotted in Figure 40 for different power levels. Figure 40 illustrates
that in this system there is no slope reversal in the pressure loss versus mass flow rate
curve.
Mass flow rate
Figure 40: Pressure Loss versus Mass Flow Rate Curves
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Next the mass flow rate versus power curve for the system will be plotted. The gravity
pressure gains of the system, APgrav, are given by Equation (A.5).
APgrav = pf -p.)g -H = a -pf g -H (A.5)
where: Pm = mixture density, H= loop height
Assuming HEM, the void fraction, a, is given by Equation (A.6) [3].
a = (A.6)
p,f x + (1- x) Pg
Equating the pressure gain of gravity and the form pressure loss and combining
Equations (A.4), (A.5), and (A.6), yields Equation (A.7).
Pg .h P Q2 f . h pf .-g-H-A 2" =0
h, rhfg*h3 +2.Q*2m + =H0  (A.7)
P Pg hg K
Equation (A.7) can be expressed in terms of non-dimensional terms as shown in Equation
(A.8).
3 + 2 ... 2 + .2 2 .*_- = 0  (A.8)
where: 7= ,7 -
p-g-H-A' h P, p7g.H-A2
K f" Pf K
Equation (A.8) is plotted in Figure 41.
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Figure 41: Non-dimensional Mass FlowRate versus Power Curve
Figure 41: Non-dimensional Mass Flow Rate versus Power Curve
Figure 41 has a peak at I = 0.5 (4 is proportional to mass flow rate and I is proportional
to power); therefore, for this simplified natural circulation loop, there is a peak in the
mass flow rate versus power curve without a slope reversal in the associated pressure loss
versus mass flow rate curves. Physically, the peak arises from the competing effects of
increasing riser-to-downcomer density difference and increasing hydraulic resistance of
the form loss, as the power (thus the steam quality) increases.
A.2 Calculation of the Duration of Time that a Nanofluid
Needs to be Effective for after Injection
The decay power as a function of the time after the reactor has shut down is given by
Equation (A.9) [3].
P(t) = Po 0.066 -t-02  (A.9)
where: P = decay power, Po = reactor operating power, t = time after shutdown
From Chapter 3, nanofluids were found to remove 42% more decay power than water;
therefore, water can remove 70.4% of the decay power that nanofluids can. This
relationship is shown in Equation (A.10).
P(t = t2) = 0.704 P(t = t1) (A.10)
where: tj = time to core relocation, t2 = time in which water can remove the same amount of decay heat
that nanofluids could at time to core relocation (tl), t2 - tl = time the nanofluid needs to be effective for
Given the time to core relocation (ti), one can calculate the time the nanofluid needs to be
effective for (t2 - ti) using Equation (A.9) and Equation (A.10). The worst-case time it
takes for core relocation to occur is dependent on the accident sequence, but the general
range is 1 to 3 hours [13]. Since IVR is based on removing the amount of heat in the
worst case (decay power will be highest the faster it can melt and relocate), the time the
nanofluid needs to be effective is likely biased towards the lower end of the range shown
in Table XI, i.e., about 5 hours.
Table XI: Sensitivity of Nanofluid Effectiveness Time to Core Relocation Time
Duration of Time that a Nanofluid Needs toTime to Core Relocation (hr)fective For (hr)Effective For (hr)
1.0 .4.8
2.0 9.6
3.0 14.3
APPENDIX B: NANOFLUID AGGLOMERATION
EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS
The stability of the nanofluid after it is significantly diluted is vital to the success of the
proposed nanofluid injection system because an unstable nanofluid will not exhibit the
enhanced CHF properties that this system utilizes. The stability of a nanofluid can be
assessed by measuring the sizes and concentration of the nanoparticles in the nanofluid.
The nanofluid used in these experiments was an alumina nanofluid manufactured by
Nyacol Nano Technologies, Inc. The concentrated form of this nanofluid as received
from the manufacturer is 20% by weight, the concentration to be used in the nanofluid
storage tanks. The diluted concentrations investigated in this experiment were 0.01% by
volume (0.04% by weight) and 0.001% by volume (0.004% by weight). At these diluted
concentrations the CHF enhancement has been experimentally observed.
For the severe accident scenarios that employ IVR, the nanofluid needs to be stable for a
period of less than a day after it is diluted as a result of being injected into the reactor
cavity (as calculated in section A.2 of Appendix A). The experimental parameters are
summarized in Table XII.
Table XII: Summary of Nanofluid Agglomeration Experimental Parameters
20% by weight, 0.01% by volume (0.04% byConcentrations weight), 0.001% by volume (0.004% by weight)
Measurement times 0 hr, 1 hr, 6 hr, 1 d
B.1 Variation of Nanoparticle Size with the Time after Dilution
This experiment consisted of diluting the concentrated nanofluid to concentrations
sufficient to see the desired CHF enhancement and then measuring the sizes of the
nanoparticles over time. Large increases in the size of the nanoparticles would indicate
nanoparticle agglomeration and thus an unstable nanofluid.
The sizes of the nanoparticles were measured using a dynamic light scattering device.
The data was analyzed using the EXPSAM algorithm (based exponential sampling,
which is also known as the Pike/Ostrowski Method). The uncertainty in the nanoparticle
size measurement is + 20 nm.
Figure 42 shows the initial nanoparticle size distribution for the concentrated (20% by
weight) nanofluid. This distribution has a mean nanoparticle diameter 5 of 37.75 nm.
25 The mean nanoparticle diameter is the number-weighted nanoparticle diameter.
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Figure 42: Initial Nanoparticle Size Distribution (20% by weight)
Figure 43 and Figure 44 show the nanoparticle size distributions I hour after dilution for
the 0.01% and 0.001% by volume concentrations, respectively. At I hour the mean
nanoparticle diameters for both of the concentrations (42.56 nm and 52.33 nm,
respectively) are within the experimental uncertainty of the nanoparticle mean diameter
of the concentrated nanofluid.
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Figure 43: Nanoparticle Size Distribution after 1 hour (0.01% by volume)
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Figure 44: Nanoparticle Size Distribution after 1 hour (0.001% by volume)
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Figure 45 and Figure 46 show the nanoparticle size distributions 6 hours after dilution for
the 0.01% and 0.001% by volume concentrations, respectively. At 6 hours the mean
nanoparticle diameters for both of the concentrations (32.64 nm and 33.36 nm,
respectively) are still within the experimental uncertainty of the nanoparticle mean
diameter of the concentrated nanofluid.
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Figure 45: Nanoparticle Size Distribution after 6 hours (0.01% by volume)
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Figure 46: Nanoparticle Size Distribution after 6 hours (0.001% by volume)
Figure 47 and Figure 48 show the nanoparticle size distributions 1 day after dilution for
the 0.01% and 0.001% by volume concentrations, respectively. The mean nanoparticle
diameters for both of the concentrations (46.71 nm and 46.74 nm, respectively) appear to
remain within the experimental uncertainty of the nanoparticle mean diameter of the
concentrated nanofluid.
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Figure 47: Nanoparticle Size Distribution after 1 day (0.01% by volume)
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Figure 48: Nanoparticle Size Distribution after 1 day (0.001% by volume)
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B.2 Variation of Concentration with the Time after Dilution
This experiment consisted of diluting the concentrated nanofluid to concentrations
sufficient to see the desired CHF enhancement and then measuring the actual
concentrations of the nanoparticles in solution over time. A large reduction in the
concentration of the nanofluid would also indicate an unstable nanofluid.
The actual concentrations of the nanoparticles in solution were measured with an
Inductively Coupled Plasma - Optical Emission Spectrometer (ICP-OES). Concentrated
alumina nanofluid was first diluted from 20% by weight to the target concentrations
(0.01% and 0.001% by volume). Seven samples were created at the specified times (at 0
hr, 1 hr, 6 hr, and 1 d) before a single set of measurements by the ICP-OES system were
taken. The results are shown in Table XIII. This experiment confirms that the alumina
nanofluids remain stable for at least 24 hours after initial dilution without significant
settling of nanoparticles.
Table XIII: OES-ICP System Concentration Measurements
Concentration
Target Time after without MeasuredSample Concentration (% initial Concentration
# agglomeration Differenceby volume) dilution (hr) agglomerofation (ppm of Al)
1 N/A 0 2.064 1.984 -3.9%
2 0.01% 1 2.064 2.139 3.6%
3 0.001% 1 0.206 0.194 -6.0%
4 0.01% 6 2.064 2.103 1.9%
5 0.001% 6 0.206 0.211 2.2%
6 0.01% 24 2.064 2.352 13.9%
7 0.001% 24 0.206 0.244 18.2%
APPENDIX C: THERMAL HYDRAULIC MODEL
SOURCE CODE
function [geo,dth,angle]=apl 000modinlet
dth=0.01;
i=1;
nl =floor((1.571-.1 49525)/dth);
n2=floor(3.826/(2.01 *dth));
n=nl+n2;
geo=null(23,n);%meters
ri=2.01;
ro=2.086;
dh=dth*ri;
for i=[1:n]
theta=(i-1)*dth+. 149525;
if theta<=1.57
angle(i)=3.14159/2-th eta;
else
angle(i)=O;
end
if i==1
geo(1,1)=0;
geo(2,1)=-ri;
geo(3,1)=O;
geo(4,1)=-2.31;
geo(5,i)=ri*sin(theta);
geo(6,i)=-ri*cos(theta);
geo(7,i)=0.348;
geo(8,i)=-2.31;
else
if theta<=0.29%.288674
geo(1,i)=geo(5,i-1);
geo(2,i)=geo(6,i-1);
geo(3,i)=geo(7,i-1);
geo(4,i)=geo(8,i-1);
geo(5,i)=ri*sin(theta);
geo(6,i)=-ri*cos(theta);
geo(7,i)=2.31 *tan(theta);
geo(8,i)=-2.31;
elseif theta<=0.34%0.335095
geo(1,i)=geo(5,i-1);
geo(2,i)=geo(6,i-1);
geo(3,i)=geo(7,i-1);
geo(4,i)=geo(8,i-1);
geo(5,i)=ri*sin(theta);
geo(6,i)=-ri*cos(theta);
geo(7,i)=0.686;
geo(8,i)=-0.686/tan(theta);
elseif theta<= 1.57%1.5708
geo(1,i)=geo(5,i-1);
geo(2,i)=geo(6,i-1);
geo(3,i)=geo(7,i-1);
geo(4,i)=geo(8,i-1);
geo(5,i)=ri*sin(theta);
geo(6,i)=-ri*cos(theta);
geo(7,i)=ro*sin(theta);
geo(8,i)=-ro*cos(theta);
else
geo(1,i)=geo(5,i-1);
geo(2,i)=geo(6,i-1);
geo(3,i)=geo(7,i-1);
geo(4,i)=geo(8,i-1);
geo(5,i)=2.01;
geo(6,i)=(i-nl)*dh;
geo(7,i)=2.086;
geo(8,i)=(i-nl)*dh;
end
end
end
for i=[1:n]
geo(9,i)=(geo(1 ,i)+geo(3,i)+geo(5,i)+geo(7,i))/4;%centroid x-coordinate
geo(10,i)=(geo(2,i)+geo(4,i)+geo(6,i)+geo(8,i))/4;%centroid y-coordinate
geo( 11,i)=0.5*abs((geo(1 ,i)*geo(4,i)-geo(3,i)*geo(2,i))+(geo(3,i)*geo(8,i)-
geo(7,i)*geo(4,i))+(geo(7,i)*geo(6,i)-geo(5,i)*geo(8,i))+(geo(5,i)*geo(2,i)-geo(1 ,i)*geo(6,i)));%area
geo(1 2,i)=geo(1 1,i)*6.28319*geo(9,1 );%volume [m^3]
geo(1 3,i)=((geo(1,i)-geo(5,i))A2+(geo(2,i)-geo(6,i))A2)A0.5;%interior length
geo(14,i)=((geo(3,i)-geo(7,i))A2+(geo(4,i)-geo(8,i))A2)A0.5;%exterior length
geo(1 5,i)=0.5*((geo(1,i)+geo(5,i)))*2*3.14159*geo(1 3,i);%interior area
geo(16,i)=0.5*((geo(3,i)+geo(7,i)))*2*3.14159*geo(14,i);%exterior area
geo(17,i)=0.5*((geo(1,i)+geo(5,i)));%interior x midpoint
geo(18,i)=0.5*((geo(3,i)+geo(7,i)));%exterior x midpoint
geo(19,i)=0.5*((geo(2,i)+geo(6,i)));%interior y midpoint
geo(20,i)=0.5*((geo(4,i)+geo(8,i)));%exterior y midpoint
geo(21,i)=((geo(17,i)-geo(18,i))A2+(geo(19,i)-geo(20,i))A2)A0.5;%hydraulic diameter, De-Di
geo(22,i)=2*3.14159*geo(9,i)*((geo(17,i)-geo(18,i))A2+(geo(19,i)-geo(20,i))A2)A0.5;%flow area
geo(23,i)=0.5*(geo(1 3,i)+geo(1 4,i));%characteristic length
end
%Non-Homogenous flow EPRI model (centerline entry) with acceleration term
%and AP1000 critical heat flux (T48A) with subcoooled boiling
function [flow]=flow6001 (geo,mdot,dth,angle,uprate)
[rn,cn]=size(geo);
n=cn;
flow=null(7,cn);
mdot=mdot;%mass flow rate [kg/s]
multiplier=l ;%nanolfluid multiplier
for j=[l:n]
theta(j)=(j-1 )*dth+. 149525;
phi(j)=(3.14159-theta(j));
if theta(j)<=15*3.14159/180
qdot(j)=(0.0065+(0.0160-0.0065)*(theta(j)-
5*3.14159/180)/(1 0*3.14159/180))*uprate;%[MW/m^2]
elseif theta(j)<=25*3.14159/180
qdot(j)=(0.01 60+(0.0704-0.0160)*(theta(j)-
15*3.14159/180)/(10*3.14159/1 80))*uprate;%[MW/m^2]
elseif theta(j)<=35*3.14159/180
qdot(j)=(0.0704+(0.1520-0.0704)*(theta(j)-
25*3.14159/180)/(1 0*3.14159/1 80))*uprate;%[MW/mA2]
elseif theta(j)<=45*3.14159/180
qdot(j)=(0.1520+(0.3060-0.1520)*(theta(j)-
35*3.14159/180)/(10*3.14159/180))*uprate;%[MW/m^2]
elseif theta(j)<=55*3.14159/180
qdot(j)=(0.3060+(0.6050-0.3060)*(theta(j)-
45*3.14159/180)/(10*3.14159/180))*uprate;%[MW/mA2]
elseif theta(j)<=65*3.14159/180
qdot(j)=(0.6050+(0.8500-0.6050)*(theta(j)-
55*3.14159/180)/(10*3.14159/180))*uprate;%[MW/m^2]
elseif theta(j)<=75*3.14159/180
qdot(j)=(0.8500+(1.1880-0.8500)*(theta(j)-
65*3.14159/180)/(10*3.14159/180))*uprate;%[MW/mA2]
elseif theta(j)<=85*3.14159/180
qdot(j)=(1 .1 880+(1.4700-1.1880)*(theta(j)-
75*3.14159/180)/(1 0*3.14159/180))*uprate;%[MW/m^2]
elseif theta(j)<=90*3.14159/180
qdot()=(1.4700+(1.4700-1.1880)*(theta(j)-
85*3.14159/180)/(10*3.14159/180))*uprate;%[MW/mA2]
else
qdot(j)=0;
end
flow(27,j)=qdot(j);
end
phase=0;
walltemp(1)=373;%initial wall temperature [K]
temp(1)=373;%initial bulk temperature (of subcooled liquid) [K]
num=1;
while phase==0
if num==1
enthalpy(num)=hf(1 00)*1 000+qdot(num)*1 06*geo(13,num)*2*3.14159*geo(17,num)/mdot;%enth
alpy [J/kg], initial enthalpy at 373 K, 152810 Pa
P(num)=1/vf(373-273)*9.81*(3.826-geo(10,num))+101325-0.5*mdotA2*vf(373 -
273)/2/0.145209;%initial pressure in Pa minus form inlet (k=0.5)
Dh(num)=geo(21 ,num);%hydraulic diameter [m], Dh=Do-Di
hfl=461300;%saturated liquid enthalpy at 1.4 atm [J/kg]
hfgl=2230200;%heat of vaporization at 1.4 atm [J/kg]
tf(num)=381.865+(P(num)-137169)/(152810-137169)*(385.086-381.865);%saturated liquid
temperature [K]
xe(num)=(enthalpy(num)-hfl)/hfgl;%equilibrium quality
temp(num)=xe(num)*(hfg 1)/4183+385;%bulk temperature of subcooled liquid [K]
rhol(num)=998-(temp(num)-293)/80*(998-958.313);%subcooled liquid density [kg/m3]
rhog(num)=0.59773+(P(num)-101400)/(143300-101400)*(0.82645-0.59773);
Pr(num)=6-(temp(num)-293)/80*(6-1.76);%Prandti number
k(num)=0.606+(temp(num)-293)/80*(0.68-.606);%liquid conductivity
%k(num)=Kf(temp(num)-273);%liquid conductivity
area(num)=geo(22,num);%flow area
Resub(num)=mdot*Dh(num)/area(num)/(279*10^-6);%Reynolds number
h(num)=k(num)/Dh(num)*0.023*(Resub(num))^0.8*(Pr(num))y0.4;%heat transfer coefficient,Dittus-Boelter
walltemp(num)=qdot(num)*10A6/h(num)+temp(num);
flow(1,num)=enthalpy(num);
flow(2,num)=0;%quality
flow(3,num)=0;%void fraction
flow(4,num)=rhol(num);
flow(6,num)=Resub(num);%Reynolds Number
flow(7,num)=0.1 84/(flow(6,num)))0.2*geo(23,num)lgeo(21 ,num)*mdot^2/(2*flow(4,num)*(geo(22,
num))A2);%pressure loss
accout(num)=0;
accin(num)=0;
flow(9,num)=accout(num)-accin(num);%acceleration term
flow(20,num)=xe(num);
flow(21 ,num)=temp(num);%bulk temperature
flow(22,num)=qdot(num)*10^A6*geo(1 3,num)*2*3.14159*geo(1 7,num);%power
if theta(num)>=(3.14159/2)
theta(num)=(3.14159/2);
phi(num)=(3.14159/2);
end
SAO=(0.65444)+(-1.2018)*(Dh(num)/2)*log(mdot/geo(22,num))+(-
0.008388)/(P(num)/l 06)A2+(0.000179)*(mdot/geo(22,num))+(1.36899)*(Dh(num)/2)/(P(num)/10
A6)+(-
0.077415)*(Dh(num)/2)/(P(num)/• 0A6)A2+(0.024967)*(P(num)/10^A6)*(log(mdot/geo(22,num)))A2;
SA1=(-0.086511)*(Iog(mdot/geo(22,num)))A2+( -
4.49425)*(Dh(num)/2)*log(mdot/geo(22,num));
SA2=(9.28489)*(Dh(num)/2);
SA3=(-
0.0066169)*(log(mdot/geo(22,num)))A2+(11.62546)*(Dh(num)/2)*(P(num)/10^6)+(0.855759)*xe(n
um)*log(mdot/geo(22,num));
SA4=(-1.74177)*(P(num)/1 0^6)+(0.182895)*Iog(mdot/geo(22,num))+(-
1.8898)*xe(num)+(2.2636)*(Dh(num)/2);
flow(23,num)=(SAO+SA1*xe(num)+SA2*(xe(num))^2+SA3*theta(num)+SA4*(theta(num))^2)* 10
6;%critical heat flux
if phi(num)>= 150/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,num)=(4.8*flow(23,num))*multiplier;%nanofluid critical heat flux (multiplier% of
graph)
elseif phi(num)>135/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,num)=((3+(phi(num)-135/180*(3.14159))/(15/180*(3.14159))*(4.8-
3))*flow(23,num))*multiplier;
elseif phi(num)>120/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,num)=((2.5+(phi(num)-1 20/180*(3.14159))/(15/180*(3.14159))*(3-
2.5))*flow(23,num))*multiplier;
elseif phi(num)>90/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,num)=((2.1 +(phi(num)-90/180*(3.14159))/(30/180*(3.14159))*(2.5-
2.1))*flow(23,num))*multiplier;
else
end
flow(24,num)--flow(23,num)/(qdot(num)*10^6);%dnbr
flow(26,num)=flow(25,num)/(qdot(num)*10^6);%nanofluid dnbr
num=num+l;
else
enthalpy(num)=flow(1,num-
1 )+qdot(num)*l 0^6*geo(13,num)*2*3.14159*geo(17,num)/mdot;%enthalpy [J/kg]
P(num)=P(num-1)-flow(7,num-1)-flow(9,num-1)-1/vf(temp(num-1)-273)*9.81*(geo(10,num)-
geo(10,num-1 ));
Dh(num)=geo(21 ,num);%hydraulic diameter [m], Dh=Do-Di
hfl=461300;%saturated liquid enthalpy at 1.4 atm [J/kg]
hfgl =2230200;%heat of vaporization at 1.4 atm [J/kg]
tf(num)=381.865+(P(num)-1 37169)/(152810-137169)*(385.086-381.865);%saturated liquid
temperature [K]
xe(num)=(enthalpy(num)-(hfl))/(hfgl);%equilibrium quality
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temp(num)=xe(num)*(hfgl )/4183+385;%bulk temperature of subcooled liquid [K]
rhol(num)=998-(temp(num)-293)/80*(998-958.313);%subcooled liquid density [kg/m3]
rhog(num)=0.59773+(P(num)-101400)/(143300-101400)*(0.82645-0.59773);
Pr(num)=6-(temp(num)-293)/80*(6-1.76);%Prandtl number
k(num)=0.606+(temp(num)-293)/80*(0.68-.606);%liquid conductivity
area(num)=geo(22,num);%flow area
Resub(num)=mdot*Dh(num)/area(num)/(279*1 0-6);%Reynolds number
h(num)=k(num)/Dh(num)*0.023*(Resub(num))^0.8*(Pr(num))AO.4;%heat transfer coefficient,
Dittus-Boelter
walltemp(num)=qdot(num)*10A6/h(num)+temp(num);
flow(1,num)=enthalpy(num);
flow(2,num)=0;%quality
flow(3,num)=0;%void fraction
flow(4,num)=rhol(num);
flow(6,num)=Resub(num);%Reynolds Number
flow(7,num)=O.184/(flow(6,num))A0.2*geo(23,num)/geo(21 ,num)*mdotA2/(2*flow(4,num)*(geo(22,
num))^2);%pressure loss
if flow(3,num)==0
accout(num)=2*mdotA2/(geo(22,num)+geo(22,num -
1 ))*(1/(rhol(num)*geo(22,num)));%acceleration out term
accin(num)=accout(num-1);%acceleration in term
flow(19,num)=rhol(num);
else
accout(num)=2*mdotA2/(geo(22,num)+geo(22,num-
1))*((flow(2,num))A2/(flow(3,num)*0.88)+(1-flow(2,num))^2/((1-
flow(3,num))*950))/geo(22,num);%acceleration out term
accin(num)=accout(num-1);%acceleration in term
rhop(num)=((flow(2,num))A2/(flow(3,num)*0.88)+(1-flow(2,num))A21((1-
flow(3,num))*950))^-1;
flow(19,num)=rhop(num);
end
flow(9,num)=accout(num)-accin(num);%acceleration term
flow(20,num)=xe(num);
flow(21 ,num)=temp(num);%bulk temperature
flow(22,num)=qdot(num)*10^6*geo(1 3,num)*2*3.14159*geo(1 7,num);%power
if theta(num)>=(3.14159/2)
theta(num)=(3.14159/2);
phi(num)=(3.14159/2);
end
SAO=(0.65444)+(-1 .2018)*(Dh(num)/2)*log(mdot/geo(22,num))+(-
0.008388)/(P(num)/1 06)A2+(0.000179)*(mdot/geo(22,num))+(1.36899)*(Dh(num)/2)/(P(num)/10
A6)+(-
0.077415)*(Dh(num)/2)/(P(num)/1 0A6)A2+(0.024967)*(P(num)/1 ~ 6)*(log(mdotlgeo(22,num)))A2;
SA1=(-0.086511 )*(log(mdot/geo(22,num)))A2+(-
4.49425)*(Dh(num)/2)*log(mdot/geo(22,num));
SA2=(9.28489)*(Dh(num)/2);
SA3=(-
0.0066169)*(log(mdot/geo(22,num)))A2+(11.62546)*(Dh(num)/2)*(P(num)/10^6)+(0.855759)*xe(n
um)*log(mdot/geo(22,num));
SA4=(-1.74177)*(P(num)/10^6)+(0.182895)*Iog(mdot/geo(22,num))+(-
1.8898)*xe(num)+(2.2636)*(Dh(num)/2);
flow(23,num)=(SAO+SA1*xe(num)+SA2*(xe(num))A2+SA3*theta(num)+SA4*(theta(num))A2)*1 O
6;%critical heat flux
if phi(num)>=150/180*(3.14159)
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flow(25,num)=(4.8*flow(23,num))*multiplier;%nanofluid critical heat flux
elseif phi(num)>135/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,num)=((3+(phi(num)-1 35/180*(3.14159))/(15/1 80*(3.14159))*(4.8-
3))*flow(23,num))*multiplier;
elseif phi(num)>120/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,num)=((2.5+(phi(num)-120/180*(3.14159))/(15/180*(3.14159))*(3-
2.5))*flow(23,num))*multiplier;
elseif phi(num)>90/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,num)=((2.1+(phi(num)-90/180*(3.14159))/(30/180*(3.14159))*(2.5-
2.1))*flow(23,num))*multiplier;
else
end
flow(24,num)=--flow(23,num)/(qdot(num)*1 0^6);%dnbr
flow(26,num)=flow(25,num)/(qdot(num)*10^6);%nanofluid dnbr
if walltemp(num)>=tf%saturated liquid temperature at 1.5 atm [385 K]
phase=1;
xc=geo(9,num);
yc=geo(10,num);
hlonb=enthalpy(num);
xeonb=xe(num);
else
end
num=num+l;
end
end
for i=[num:n]
if flow(1 ,i-1)<=2676100%below bulk boiling
flow(1 ,i)=flow(1 ,i-1)+qdot(i)* 10^6*geo(1 3,i)*2*3.14159*geo(1 7,i)/mdot;%enthalpy [J/kg]
xe(i)=(flow(1 ,i)-hfl)/hfgl;
Dh(i)=geo(21,i);%hydraulic diameter [m], Dh=Do-Di
P(i)=P(i-1)-flow(7,i-1 )-flow(9,i-)-rhol(i-1)*9.81*(geo(10,i)-geo(10,i-1));
tsat(i)=373.15+(P(i)-101400)/(152330-101400)*(385-373.15);
tsat(num-1)=373.15+(P(num-1)-101400)/(152330-101400)*(385-373.15);
temp(i)=xe(i)*hfgl/4183+385;%bulk temperature of subcooled liquid [K]
if temp(i)>=tsat(i)
temp(i)=tsat(i);
else
end
rhol(i)=998-(temp(i)-293)/80*(998-958.313);%subcooled liquid density [kg/m3]
Pr(i)=6-(temp(i)-293)/80*(6-1.76);%Prandtl number
k(i)=0.606+(temp(i)-293)/80*(0.68-.606);%liquid conductivity
area(i)=geo(22,i);%flow area
Re(i)=mdot*Dh(i)/area(i)/(279*10A-6);%(1 -flow(2,i-1 ));%Reynolds number
h(i)=k(i)/Dh(i)*0.023*(Re(i))AO.8*(Pr(i))^0.4;%heat transfer coefficient, Dittus-Boelter
walltemp(i)=qdot(i)*10 A6/h(i)+temp(i);
flow(3,num-1 )=0;
alphabub(num-1)=flow(3,num-2);
alphabub(i)=flow(3,i-1);
tlc(num-1)=tsat(num-1)-(4183*(tsat(num-1)-temp(num-1))+hfgl*flow(2,num-
1))/(4183*(1-flow(2,num-1)));
tl(num-1)=tlc(num-1);
dz(num-1 )=geo(23,num-1);
dz(i)=geo(23,i);
if alphabub(num-1)<10A-5
F4(num-1 )=flow(3,num-2)* 10^5;
alphabub(num-1)=10^-5;
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else
F4(num-1)=l;
end
F3(num-1)=F4(num-1);
if alphabub(i)<10^-5
F4(i)=flow(3,i-1 )*10^5;
alphabub(i)=10^-5;
else
F4(i)=1;
end
F3(i)=F4(i);
rhof=955;%saturated liquid density
rhog(i)=0.59773+(P(i)-1 01400)/(143300-101400)*(0.82645-0.59773);
if alphabub(num-1)<0.25
vflux(num-1)=mdot/rhol(num-1)/area(num-1)/(1-flow(2,num-2));
if abs(vflux(num-1))>0.61
phihif(num-1)=(1.639344*abs(vflux(num-1)))A0.47;
else
phihif(num-1)=1;
end
C(num-1)=65-(5.69*10^-5)*(P(num-1)-10^5);
F5(num-1)=1.8*phihif(num-1 )*C(num-1 )*exp(-45*alphabub(num-1 ))+0.075;
else
F5(num-1)=0.075;
end
Hif(num-1)=(F3(num-1)*F5(num-1)*hfgl*rhog(num-1)*rhof*alphabub(num-1 ))/(rhof-
rhog(num-1 ));
if alphabub(i)<0.25
vflux(i)=mdot/rhol(i)/area(i)/(1-flow(2,i-1));
if abs(vflux(i))>0.61
phihif(i)=(1.639344*abs(vflux(i)))^0.47;
else
phihif(i)=1;
end
C(i)=65-(5.69*10^-5)*(P(i)-10^5);
F5(i)=1.8*phihif(i)*C(i)*exp(-45*alphabub(i))+0.075;
else
F5(i)=0.075;
end
Hif(i)=(F3(i)*F5(i)*hfgl *rhog(i)*rhof*alphabub(i))/(rhof-rhog(i));
if qdot(i)==0
if tl(i-1)>=temp(i-1)
tl(i)=tl(i-1);
flow(2,i)=flow(2,i-1);
else
tl(i)=tl(i-1 )+(Hif(i-1)*(tsat(i-1 )-tl(i-1))*area(i-1)*dz(i-1))/((1-flow(2,i-1))*mdot*4183);
collapse=300;
flow(2,i)=flow(2,i-1)-(Hif(i-1)*(tsat(i-1)-tl(i-1))*collapse*area(i-1)*dz(i-
1))/(mdot*hfg l);
if flow(2,i)<=0
flow(2,i)=0;
else
end
end
else
tl(i)=tlc(i-1);
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flow(2,i)=xe(i)-xeonb*exp((xe(i)/xeonb)-l);%quality, Levy Model
end
hf2(i)=(419.04+(tsat(i)-373)/1 0*(461.30-419.04))*1 000;
hfg2(i)=(2257+(tsat(i)-373)/1 0*(2230.2-2257))*1 000;
if hf2(i)<=flow(1,i)
flow(2,i)=(flow(1 ,i)-hf2(i))/(hfg2(i));
else
end
onephvis=0.000281832;%one phase viscosity
onephden(i)=rhol(i);%one phase density
onephre(i)=mdot*geo(21,i)/(geo(22,i)*onephvis);%one phase Re
[flow(3,i),jg(i)jf(i),jf(i),cO(i)]=epri(flow(2,i),mdot,geo(22,i),angle(i),geo(21,i));
flow(4,i)=flow(3,i)*rhog(i)+(1-flow(3,i))*onephden(i);%density [kg/mA3]
flow(5,i)=flow(3,i)*0.000012+(1-flow(3,i))*0.000281832;%viscosity [N*s/mA2]
flow(6,i)=mdot*geo(21,i)/(geo(22,i)*flow(5,i));%Reynolds Number
flow(8,i)=onephre(i);
if flow(3,i)==0
flow(10,i)=100000;
else
flow(10,i)=jg(i)/jf(i)*(1-flow(3,i))/flow(3,i);%slip ratio
end
flow(11 ,i)=jg(i);
flow(1 2,i)=jf(i);
flow(1 3,i)=jg(i)/jf(i);
flow(1 6,i)=[1 +flow(2,i)*(onephden(i)/.59773-1)];
rhobar=(flow(2,i)/rhog(i)+(1 -flow(2,i))/onephden(i))^-1;
We=mdotA2*geo(21,i)/((geo(22,i))A2*rhobar*0.0589);
Fr=mdotA2/(9.81 *geo(21,i)*(rhobar)A2*(geo(22,i))A2);
Al =(1-flow(2,i))A2+((flow(2,i))^2)*(onephden(i)/0.59773)*(0.0000012/0.000281832)^0.2;
A2=(flow(2, i))^0.78*(1 -flow(2,i))^0.224;
A3=(onephden(i)/rhog(i)))0.91*(0.0000012/0.000281832)'~.19*(1-
0.0000012/0.000281832)y0.7;
flow(18,i)=A 1+3.24*A2*A3/(FrA0.045*We^0.035);%two phase flow friction factor Friedel
correlation
flow(7,i)=0.1 84/onephre(i)^0.2*geo(23,i)/geo(21 ,i)*mdotA2/(2*onephden(i)*(geo(22,i))A2)*flow(1 8,i)
;%pressure loss
if flow(3,i)==0
accout(i)=2*mdotA2/(geo(22,i)+geo(22,i -
1))*(1/(onephden(i)*geo(22, i)));%acceleration out term
accin(i)=accout(i-1 );%acceleration in term
flow(19,i)=rhol(i);
else
accout(i)=2*mdotA2/(geo(22,i)+geo(22,i - 1 ))*( (fl o w (2 ,i))A2 / (fl o w (3 ,i)*r h o g (i)) +( 1 -
flow(2,i))^2/((1 -flow(3,i))*onephden(i)))/geo(22,i);%acceleration out term
accin(i)=accout(i-1 );%acceleration in term
rhop(i)=((flow(2,i))^2/(flow(3,i)*rhog(i))+(1-flow(2,i))^2/((1-flow(3,i))*onephden(i)))^-1;
flow(19,i)=rhop(i);
end
flow(9,i)=accout(i)-accin(i);%acceleration pressure loss
flow(20,i)=xe(i);
if flow(20,i)<=0
flow(21,i)=temp(i);%bulk temperature
else
flow(21,i)=373;
end
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flow(22,i)=qdot(i)*l 10^6*geo(1 3,i)*2*3.14159*geo(1 7,i);%power
tlc(i)=tsat(i)-(4183*(tsat(i)-temp(i))+hfgl*flow(2,i))/(4183*(1-flow(2,i)));
if theta(i)>=(3.14159/2)
theta(i)=(3.14159/2);
phi(i)=(3.14159/2);
end
SAO=(0.65444)+(-1.2018)*(Dh(i)/2)*log(mdot/geo(22,i))+(-
0.008388)/(P(i)/1 06)^2+(/l OA179)*(mdot/geo(22,i))+(1 .36899)*(Dh(i)/2)/(P(i)/1 0A6)+(-
0.077415)*(Dh(i)/2)/(P(i)/1 06)A2+(0.024967)*(P(i)/1 06)*(log(mdotlgeo(22,i)))A2;
SA1 =(-0.086511( )*(log(mdot/geo(22,i)))A2+(-4.49425)*(Dh(i)/2)*log(mdot/geo(22,i));
SA2=(9.28489)*(Dh(i)/2);
SA3=(-
0.0066169)*(log(mdot/geo(22,i)))^2+(11.62546)*(Dh(i)/2)*(P(i)/)/10^6)+(0.855759)*xe(i)*log(mdot/g
eo(22,i));
SA4=(-1.74177)*(P(i)/10^A6)+(0.182895)*iog(mdot/geo(22,i))+(-
1.8898)*xe(i)+(2.2636)*(Dh(i)/2);
flow(23,i)=(SAO+SA1*xe(i)+SA2*(flow(2, i))A2+SA3*xe(i)+SA4*(theta(i))A2)*l106;%critical heat flux
if phi(i)>=150/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,i)=(4.8*flow(23,i))*multiplier;%nanofluid critical heat flux
elseif phi(i)>135/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,i)=((3+(phi(i)-1 35/1 80*(3.14159))/(15/180*(3.14159))*(4.8-
3))*flow(23,i))*multiplier;
elseif phi(i)>120/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,i)=((2.5+(phi(i)-120/180*(3.14159))/(15/180*(3.14159))*(3-
2.5))*flow(23,i))*multiplier;
elseif phi(i)>90/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,i)=((2.1 +(phi(i)-90/180*(3.14159))/(30/180*(3.14159))*(2.5-
2.1))*flow(23,i))*multiplier;
else
end
if qdot(i)==0
flow(24,i)=25;
flow(26,i)=25;
else
flow(24,i)=flow(23,i)/(qdot(i)*1 0^6);%dnbr
flow(26,i)=flow(25,i)/(qdot(i)*1 0^6);%nanofluid dnbr
end
else
bulkboiling=1
end
end
flow(14,:)=geo(22,:);
flow(15,:)=cO;
flow(17,1 )=cn;
%Non-Homogenous flow EPRI model (centerline entry) with acceleration term
%and AP1000 critical heat flux (T40B) with subcoooled boiling
function [flow]=flow6002(geo,mdot,dth,angle,uprate)
[rn,cn]=size(geo);
n=cn;
flow=null(7,cn);
mdot=mdot;%mass flow rate [kg/s]
multiplier=l ;%nanolfluid multiplier
for j=[1 :n]
theta(j)=(j-1 )*dth+. 149525;
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phi(j)=(3.14159-theta(j));
if theta(j)<=15*3.14159/180
qdot(j)=(0.65*.02+(0.80*.05-0.65*.02)*(theta(j)-
5*3.14159/180)/(10*3.14159/180))*uprate;%[MW/m^2]
elseif theta(j)<=25*3.14159/180
qdot(j)=(0.80*.05+(0.88*.13-0.80*.05)*(theta(j)-
15*3.14159/180)/(10*3.14159/180))*uprate;%[MW/mA2]
elseif theta(j)<=35*3.14159/180
qdot(j)=(0.88*.13+(0.95*.25-0.88*.13)*(theta(j)-
25*3.14159/180)/(10*3.14159/180))*uprate;%[MW/mA2]
elseif theta(j)<=45*3.14159/180
qdot(j)=(0.95*.25+(1.02*.57-0.95*.25)*(theta(j)-
35*3.14159/180)/(10*3.14159/180))*uprate;%[MW/mA2]
elseif theta(j)<=55*3.14159/180
qdot(j)=(1.02*.57+(1.1 *.72-1.02*.57)*(theta(j)-
45*3.14159/180)/(10*3.14159/180))*uprate;%[MW/mA2]
elseif theta(j)<=65*3.14159/180
qdot(j)=(1.1 *.72+(1.25*.85-1.1 *.72)*(theta(j)-
55*3.14159/180)/(1 0*3.14159/180))*uprate;%[MW/mA2]
elseif theta(j)<=75*3.14159/180
qdot(j)=(1.25*.85+(1.35*.70-1.25*.85)*(theta(j)-
65*3.14159/180)/(1 0*3.14159/180))*uprate;%[MW/mA2]
elseif theta(j)<=85*3.14159/180
qdot(j)=(1.35*.70+(1.47*.72-1.35*.70)*(theta(j)-
75*3.14159/180)/(10*3.14159/1 80))*uprate;%[MW/m^2]
elseif theta(j)<=90*3.14159/180
qdot(j)=(1.47*.72+(1.47*.72-1.35*.70)*(theta(j)-
85*3.14159/180)/(10*3.14159/180))*uprate;%[MW/mA2]
else
qdot(j)=0*uprate;
end
flow(27,j)=qdot(j);
end
phase=0;
walltemp(1)=373;%initial wall temperature [K]
temp(1)=373;%initial bulk temperature (of subcooled liquid) [K]
num=l;
while phase==0
if num==1
enthalpy(num)=hf(1 00)*1 000+qdot(num)*1 06*geo(1 3,num)*2*3.14159*geo(1 7,num)/mdot;%enth
alpy [J/kg], initial enthalpy at 373 K, 152810 Pa
P(num)=1/vf(373-273)*9.81 *(3.826-geo(10,num))+101325-0.5*mdotA2*vf(373 -
273)/2/0.145209;%initial pressure in Pa minus form inlet (k=0.5)
Dh(num)=geo(21,num);%hydraulic diameter [m], Dh=Do-Di
hfl=461300;%saturated liquid enthalpy at 1.4 atm [J/kg]
hfgl=2230200;%heat of vaporization at 1.4 atm [J/kg]
ff(num)=381.865+(P(num)-1 37169)/(152810-137169)*(385.086-381.865);%saturated liquid
temperature [K]
xe(num)=(enthalpy(num)-hfl)/hfgl;%equilibrium quality
temp(num)=xe(num)*(hfgl)/4183+385;%bulk temperature of subcooled liquid [K]
rhol(num)=998-(temp(num)-293)/80*(998-958.313);%subcooled liquid density [kg/m3]
rhog(num)=0.59773+(P(num)-101400)/(143300-101400)*(0.82645-0.59773);
Pr(num)=6-(temp(num)-293)/80*(6-1.76);%Prandti number
k(num)=0.606+(temp(num)-293)/80*(0..6806);%Iiquid conductivity
%k(num)=Kf(temp(num)-273);%liquid conductivity
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area(num)=geo(22,num); %flow area
Resub(num)=mdot*Dh(num)/area(num)/(279*1 0^-6);%Reynolds number
h(num)=k(num)/Dh(num)*0.023*(Resub(num))A^0.8*(Pr(num))^0.4;%heat transfer coefficient,
Dittus-Boelter
walltemp(num)=qdot(num)*10A6/h(num)+temp(num);
flow(1 ,num)=enthalpy(num);
flow(2,num)=0;%quality
flow(3,num)=0;%void fraction
flow(4,num)=rhol(num);
flow(6,num)=Resub(num);%Reynolds Number
flow(7,num)=0.184/(flow(6,num))^0.2*geo(23,num)/geo(21 ,num)*mdotA2/(2*flow(4,num)*(geo(22,
num))A2);%pressure loss
accout(num)=0;
accin(num)=0;
flow(9,num)=accout(num)-accin(num);%acceleration term
flow(20,num)=xe(num);
flow(21 ,num)=temp(num);%bulk temperature
flow(22,num)=qdot(num)*1 0^6*geo(1 3,num)*2*3.14159*geo(1 7,num);%power
if theta(num)>=(3.14159/2)
theta(num)=(3.14159/2);
phi(num)=(3.14159/2);
end
SAO=(0.65444)+(-1.2018)*0.076*log(mdot/geo(22,num))+(-
0.008388)/(0.1 )A2+(0.000179)*(mdot/geo(22,num))+(1.36899)*0.076/0.1+(-
0.077415)*0.076/(0.1)^2+(0.024967)*0.1 *(log(mdot/geo(22,num)))A2;
SA1 =(-0.086511 )*(log(mdot/geo(22,num)))^2+(-4.49425)*0.076*Iog(mdot/geo(22,num));
SA2=(9.28489)*0.076;
SA3=(-
0.0066169)*(Iog(mdot/geo(22,num)))A2+(11.62546)*0.076*0.1 +(0.855759)*xe(num)*log(mdot/geo(22,num));
SA4=(-1.74177)*0.1 +(0.182895)*log(mdot/geo(22,num))+(-
1.8898)*xe(num)+(2.2636)*0.076;
flow(23,num)=(SAO+SA1*xe(num)+SA2*(xe(num))A2+SA3*theta(num)+SA4*(theta(num))^2)*1 A
6;%critical heat flux
if phi(num)>=150/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,num)=(4.8*flow(23,num))*multiplier;%nanofluid critical heat flux (multiplier% of
graph)
elseif phi(num)>135/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,num)=((3+(phi(num)-135/180*(3.14159))/(15/180*(3.14159))*(4.8-
3))*flow(23,num))*multiplier;
elseif phi(num)>120/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,num)=((2.5+(phi(num)-120/180*(3.14159))/(15/180*(3.14159))*(3-
2.5))*flow(23,num))*multiplier;
elseif phi(num)>90/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,num)=((2.1 +(phi(num)-90/180*(3.14159))/(30/180*(3.14159))*(2.5-
2.1))*flow(23,num))*multiplier;
else
end
flow(24,num)=flow(23,num)/(qdot(num)*10^6);%dnbr
flow(26,num)=flow(25,num)/(qdot(num)*10^6);%nanofluid dnbr
num=num+1;
else
enthalpy(num)=flow(1,num-
1)+qdot(num)*l 0^6*geo(13,num)*2*3.14159*geo(17,num)/mdot;%enthalpy [J/kgl
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P(num)=P(num-1 )-flow(7,num-1 )-flow(9,num-1)-l/vf(temp(num-1 )-273)*9.81 *(geo(10,num)-
geo(10,num-1));
%P(num)=P(num-1 )- 1/vf(temp(num-1 )-273)*9.81 *(geo( 10,num)-geo(10,num-1 ));
Dh(num)=geo(21,num);%hydraulic diameter [m], Dh=Do-Di
hfl=461300;%saturated liquid enthalpy at 1.4 atm [J/kg]
hfgl=2230200;%heat of vaporization at 1.4 atm [J/kg]
ff(num)=381.865+(P(num)-137169)/(152810-137169)*(385.086-381.865);%saturated liquid
temperature [K]
xe(num)=(enthalpy(num)-(hfl))/(hfgl );%equilibrium quality
temp(num)=xe(num)*(hfgl)/4183+385;%bulk temperature of subcooled liquid [K]
rhol(num)=998-(temp(num)-293)/80*(998-958.313);%subcooled liquid density [kg/m3]
rhog(num)=0.59773+(P(num)-101400)/(143300-101400)*(0.82645-0.59773);
Pr(num)=6-(temp(num)-293)/80*(6-1.76);%Prandtl number
k(num)=0.606+(temp(num)-293)/80*(0.68-.606);%liquid conductivity
%k(num)=Kf(temp(num)-273);%Iiquid conductivity
area(num)=geo(22,num);%flow area
Resub(num)=mdot*Dh(num)/area(num)/(279*1 OA-6);%Reynolds number
h(num)=k(num)/Dh(num)*0.023*(Resub(num))^0.8*(Pr(num))AO.4;%heat transfer coefficient,
Dittus-Boelter
walltemp(num)=qdot(num)*10^6/h(num)+temp(num);
flow(1,num)=enthalpy(num);
flow(2,num)=0;%quality
flow(3,num)=0;%void fraction
flow(4,num)=rhol(num);
flow(6,num)=Resub(num);%Reynolds Number
flow(7,num)=O.1 84/(flow(6,num))A .2*geo(23,num)/geo(21 ,num)*mdotA2/(2*flow(4,num)*(geo(22,
num))A2);%pressure loss
if flow(3,num)==0
accout(num)=2*mdotA2/(geo(22,num)+geo(22,num -
1))*(1/(rhol(num)*geo(22,num)));%acceleration out term
accin(num)=accout(num-1);%acceleration in term
flow(19,num)=rhol(num);
else
accout(num)=2*mdotA2/(geo(22,num)+geo(22,num-
1))*((flow(2,num))A2/(flow(3,num)*0.88)+(1-flow(2,num))^2/((1-
flow(3,num))*950))/geo(22,num);%acceleration out term
accin(num)=accout(num-1);%acceleration in term
rhop(num)=((flow(2,num))A2/(flow(3,num)*0.88)+(1-flow(2,num))^2/((1-
flow(3,num))*950))^-1;
flow(19,num)=rhop(num);
end
flow(9,num)=accout(num)-accin(num);%acceleration term
flow(20,num)=xe(num);
flow(21 ,num)=temp(num);%bulk temperature
flow(22,num)=qdot(num)*10^ 6*geo(1 3,num)*2*3.14159*geo(17,num);%power
if theta(num)>=(3.14159/2)
theta(num)=(3.14159/2);
phi(num)=(3.14159/2);
end
SAO=(0.65444)+(-1.2018)*0.076*log(mdot/geo(22,num))+(-
0.008388)/(0.1 )A2+(0.000179)*(mdot/geo(22,num))+(1.36899)*0.076/0.1 +(-
0.077415)*0.076/(0.1 )A2+(0.024967)*0.1 *(log(mdot/geo(22,num)))A2;
SA1 =(-0.08651 1)*(og(mdot/geo(22,num)))^2+(-4.49425)*0.076* og(mdot/geo(22,num));
SA2=(9.28489)*0.076;
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SA3=(-
0.0066169)*(Iog(mdot/geo(22,num)))A2+(11.62546)*0.076*0.1 +(0.855759)*xe(num)*Iog(mdot/geo
(22,num));
SA4=(-1.74177)*0.1 +(0.1 82895)*log(mdot/geo(22,num))+(-
1.8898)*xe(num)+(2.2636)*0.076;
flow(23,num)=(SAO+SAl *xe(num)+SA2*(xe(num))A2+SA3*theta(num)+SA4*(theta(num))A2)*1 0A
6;%critical heat flux
if phi(num)>=150/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,num)=(4.8*flow(23,num))*multiplier;%nanofluid critical heat flux
elseif phi(num)>135/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,num)=((3+(phi(num)-1 35/180*(3.141 59))/(15/1 80*(3.14159))*(4.8-
3))*flow(23,num))*multiplier;
elseif phi(num)>120/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,num)=((2.5+(phi(num)-1 20/180*(3.14159))/(15/180*(3.14159))*(3-
2.5))*flow(23,num))*multiplier;
elseif phi(num)>90/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,num)=((2.1 +(phi(num)-90/180*(3.14159))/(30/180*(3.14159))*(2.5-
2.1 ))*flow(23,num))*multiplier;
else
end
flow(24,num)=flow(23,num)/(qdot(num)*10^6);%dnbr
flow(26,num)=flow(25,num)/(qdot(num)*10^6);%nanofluid dnbr
if walltemp(num)>=tf%saturated liquid temperature at 1.5 atm [385 K]
phase=1;
xc=geo(9,num);
yc=geo(10,num);
hlonb=enthalpy(num);
xeonb=xe(num);
else
end
num=num+l;
end
end
for i=[num:n]
if flow(1 ,i-1 )<=26761 00%below bulk boiling
flow(1 ,i)=flow(1 ,i-1)+qdot(i)*10^A6*geo(1 3,i)*2*3.14159*geo(1 7,i)/mdot;%enthalpy [J/kg]
xe(i)=(flow(1,i)-hfl )/hfgl;
Dh(i)=geo(21,i);%hydraulic diameter [m], Dh=Do-Di
P(i)=P(i-1 )-flow(7,i-1 )-flow(9,i-1 )-rhol(i-1 )*9.81 *(geo(l 0,i)-geo( 10,i-1));
tsat(i)=373.15+(P(i)-101400)/(152330-101400)*(385-373.15);
tsat(num-1)=373.15+(P(num-1)-101400)/(152330-101400)*(385-373.15);
temp(i)=xe(i)*hfgl/4183+385;%bulk temperature of subcooled liquid [K]
if temp(i)>=tsat(i)
temp(i)=tsat(i);
else
end
rhol(i)=998-(temp(i)-293)/80*(998-958.313);%subcooled liquid density [kg/m3]
Pr(i)=6-(temp(i)-293)/80*(6-1.76);%Prandtl number
k(i)=0.606+(temp(i)-293)/80*(0.68-.606);%liquid conductivity
area(i)=geo(22,i);%flow area
Re(i)=mdot*Dh(i)/area(i)/(279*1 0^-6);%(1 -flow(2,i-1 ));%Reynolds number
h(i)=k(i)/Dh(i)*0.023*(Re(i))AO.8*(Pr(i))^0.4;%heat transfer coefficient, Dittus-Boelter
walltemp(i)=qdot(i)*1 0^6/h(i)+temp(i);
flow(3,num-1 )=0;
alphabub(num-1)=flow(3,num-2);
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alphabub(i)=flow(3,i-1);
tlc(num-1 )=tsat(num-1 )-(4183*(tsat(num-l1 )-temp(num-1 ))+hfgl*flow(2,num-
1))/(4183*(1-flow(2,num-1)));
tl(num-1)=tlc(num-1);
dz(num-1 )=geo(23,num-1);
dz(i)=geo(23,i);
if alphabub(num-1)<10^-5
F4(num-1 )=flow(3,num-2)*10^ 5;
alphabub(num-1)=10^-5;
else
F4(num-1)=l;
end
F3(num-1)=F4(num-1);
if alphabub(i)<10A-5
F4(i)=flow(3,i-1 )*10 5;
alphabub(i)= 10^-5;
else
F4(i)=1;
end
F3(i)=F4(i);
rhof=955;%saturated liquid density
rhog(i)=0.59773+(P(i)-101 400)/(143300-101400)*(0.82645-0.59773);
if alphabub(num-1)<0.25
vflux(num-1 )=mdot/rhol(num-1 )/area(num-1 )/(1 -flow(2,num-2));
if abs(vflux(num-1))>0.61
phihif(num-1)=(1.639344*abs(vflux(num-1)))0A.47;
else
phihif(num-1)=l;
end
C(num-1)=65-(5.69*1 0^-5)*(P(num-1)-_10A5);
F5(num-1)=1.8*phihif(num-1 )*C(num-1 )*exp(-45*alphabub(num-1 ))+0.075;
else
F5(num-1)=0.075;
end
Hif(num-1)=(F3(num-1)*F5(num-1)*hfgl*rhog(num-1)*rhof*alphabub(num-1))/(rhof-
rhog(num-1));
if alphabub(i)<0.25
vflux(i)=mdot/rhol(i)/area(i)/(1-flow(2,i-1));
if abs(vflux(i))>0.61
phihif(i)=(1.639344*abs(vflux(i)))A0.47;
else
phihif(i)=1;
end
C(i)=65-(5.69*10^-5)*(P(i)-10^5);
F5(i)=1.8*phihif(i)*C(i)*exp(-45*alphabub(i))+0.075;
else
F5(i)=0.075;
end
Hif(i)=(F3(i)*F5(i)*hfgl *rhog(i)*rhof*alphabub(i))/(rhof-rhog(i));
if qdot(i)==0
if tl(i-1)>=temp(i-1)
tl(i)=tl(i-1);
flow(2,i)=flow(2,i-1);
else
tl(i)=tl(i-1)+(Hif(i-1)*(tsat(i- )-tl(i-1))*area(i- )*dz(i-1))/((1-flow(2,i-1))*mdot*4183);
collapse=300;
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flow(2,i)=flow(2,i-1)-(Hif(i-1)*(tsat(i-1)-tl(i-1))*collapse*area(i-1)*dz(i-
1))/(mdot*hfgl);
if flow(2,i)<=0
flow(2,i)=0;
else
end
end
else
tl(i)=tlc(i-1);
flow(2,i)=xe(i)-xeonb*exp((xe(i)/xeonb)-l );%quality, Levy Model
end
hf2(i)=(419.04+(tsat(i)-373)/1 0*(461.30-419.04))*1000;
hfg2(i)=(2257+(tsat(i)-373)/1 0*(2230.2-2257))*1000;
if hf2(i)<=flow(1,i)
flow(2,i)=(flow(1,i)-hf2(i))/(hfg2(i));
else
end
onephvis=0.000281832;%one phase viscosity
onephden(i)=rhol(i);%one phase density
onephre(i)=mdot*geo(21 ,i)/(geo(22,i)*onephvis);%one phase Re
[flow(3,i),jg(i),jf(i),cO(i)]=epri(flow(2,i),mdot,geo(22,i),angle(i),geo(21,i));
flow(4,i)=flow(3,i)*rhog(i)+(1-flow(3,i))*onephden(i);%density [kg/m^3]
flow(5,i)=flow(3,i)*0.000012+(1 -flow(3,i))*0.000281832;%viscosity [N*s/mA2]
flow(6,i)=mdot*geo(21 ,i)/(geo(22,i)*flow(5,i));%Reynolds Number
flow(8,i)=onephre(i);
if flow(3,i)==0
flow( 10,i)=1 00000;
else
flow(10,i)=jg(i)/jf(i)*(1 -flow(3,i))/flow(3,i);%slip ratio
end
flow(11 ,i)=jg(i);
flow(12,i)=jf(i);
flow(13, i)=jg(i)/jf(i);
flow(1 6,i)=[1l+flow(2,i)*(onephden(i)/.59773-1)];
rhobar=(flow(2,i)/0.59773+(1 -flow(2,i))/onephden(i))^-1;
We=mdotA2*geo(21 ,i)/((geo(22,i))A2*rhobar*0.0589);
Fr=mdot^2/(9.81 *geo(21 ,i)*(rhobar)A2*(geo(22,i))A2);
Al =(1-flow(2,i))A2+((flow(2,i))A2)*(onephden(i)/0.59773)*(0.000001 2/0.000281832)^0.2;
A2=(flow(2,i))A0.78*(1 -flow(2, i))^0.224;
A3=(onephden(i)/0.59773)^0.91 *(0.0000012/0.000281832)^0.1 9*(1-
0.0000012/0.000281832)^0.7;
flow(18,i)=A 1+3.24*A2*A3/(FrA0.045*WeAO.035);%two phase flow friction factor Friedel
correlation
flow(7,i)=0.184/onephre(i)^0.2*geo(23,i)geo(21 ,i)*mdotA2/(2*onephden(i)*(geo(22,i))A2)*flow(1 8,i)
;%pressure loss
if flow(3,i)==0
accout(i)=2*mdotA2/(geo(22,i)+geo(22,i -
1 ))*(1/(onephden(i)*geo(22,i)));%acceleration out term
accin(i)=accout(i-1);%acceleration in term
flow(19,i)=rhol(i);
else
accout(i)=2*mdotA2/(geo(22,i)+geo(22,i-1))*((flow(2 ,i))A2/(flow(3 ,i)*rhog(i))+( 1-
flow(2,i))A2/((1-flow(3,i))*onephden(i)))/geo(22,i);%acceleration out term
accin(i)=accout(i-1);%acceleration in term
rho••p(i)=((flow(2,i))^2/(flow(3,i)*rhog(i))+(1-flow(2,i))A2/((1-flow(3,i))*onephden(i)))~·1;
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flow(19,i)=rhop(i);
end
flow(9,i)=accout(i)-accin(i);%acceleration pressure loss
flow(20,i)=xe(i);
if flow(20,i)<=0
flow(21 ,i)=temp(i);%bulk temperature
else
flow(21 ,i)=373;
end
flow(22,i)=qdot(i)*1 0^6*geo(1 3,i)*2*3.14159*geo(1 7,i);%power
tlc(i)=tsat(i)-(4183*(tsat(i)-temp(i))+hfgl*flow(2,i))/(4183*(1-flow(2,i)));
if theta(i)>=(3.14159/2)
theta(i)=(3.14159/2);
phi(i)=(3.14159/2);
end
SA0=(0.65444)+(-1 .2018)*0.076*log(mdot/geo(22,i))+(-
0.008388)/(0.1 )A2+(0.000179)*(mdot/geo(22,i))+(1.36899)*0.076/0.1 +(-
0.077415)*0.076/(0.1 )2+(0.024967)*0.1*(Iog(mdot/geo(22,i)))A2;
SA1 =(-0.08651 1)*(log(mdot/geo(22,i)))A2+(-4.49425)*0.076*log(mdot/geo(22,i));
SA2=(9.28489)*0.076;
SA3=(-
0.0066169)*(log(mdotlgeo(22,i)))A2+(11.62546)*0.076*0.1 +(0.855759)*xe(i)*log(mdot/geo(22,i));
SA4=(-1.74177)*0.1+(0.182895)*log(mdot/geo(22,i))+(-1.8898)*xe(i)+(2.2636)*0.076;
flow(23,i)=(SAO+SA1*xe(i)+SA2*(xe(i))A2+SA3*theta(i)+SA4*(theta(i))A2)*10A6;%critical
heat flux
if phi(i)>=150/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,i)=(4.8*flow(23,i))*multiplier;%nanofluid critical heat flux
elseif phi(i)> 135/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,i)=((3+(phi(i)-1 35/180*(3.14159))/(15/180*(3.14159))*(4.8-
3))*flow(23,i))*multiplier;
elseif phi(i)>120/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,i)=((2.5+(phi(i)-1201180*(3.14159))/(15/180*(3.14159))*(3-
2.5))*flow(23,i))*multiplier;
elseif phi(i)>90/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,i)=((2.1 +(phi(i)-90/180*(3.14159))/(30/180*(3.14159))*(2.5-
2.1 ))*flow(23,i))*multiplier;
else
end
if qdot(i)==0
flow(24,i)=25;
flow(26,i)=25;
else
flow(24,i)=flow(23,i)/(qdot(i)* 10^6);%dnbr
flow(26,i)=flow(25,i)/(qdot(i)*10^6);%nanofluid dnbr
end
else
bulkboiling=1
end
end
flow(1 4,:)=geo(22,:);
flow(1 5,:)=cO;
flow(17,1)=cn;
%Non-Homogenous flow EPRI model (centerline entry) with acceleration term
%and AP1000 critical heat flux (T40D) with subcoooled boiling
function [flow]=flow6003(geo,mdot,dth,angle,uprate)
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[rn,cn]=size(geo);
n=cn;
flow=null(7,cn);
mdot=mdot;%mass flow rate [kg/s]
multiplier=l1;%nanolfluid multiplier
for j=[1 :n]
theta(j)=U-1 )*dth+. 149525;
phi(j)=(3.14159-theta(j));
if theta(j)<= 15*3.14159/180
qdot(j)=(0.65*.02+(0.80*.05-0.65*.02)*(theta(j)-
5*3.14159/180)/(1 0*3.14159/180))*uprate;%[MW/m^2]
elseif theta(j)<=25*3.14159/180
qdot(j)=(0.80*.05+(0.88*.1 3-0.80*.05)*(theta(j)-
15*3.14159/180)/(10*3.14159/180))*uprate;%[MW/m^2]
elseif theta(j)<=35*3.14159/180
qdot(j)=(0.88*.13+(0.95*.25-0.88*.1 3)*(theta(j)-
25*3.14159/180)/(10*3.14159/180))*uprate;%[MW/m^2]
elseif theta(j)<=45*3.14159/180
qdot(j)=(0.95*.25+(1.02*.57-0.95*.25)*(theta(j)-
35*3.14159/180)/(10*3.14159/180))*uprate;%[MW/mA2]
elseif theta(j)<=55*3.14159/180
qdot(j)= (1.02*.57+(1.1 *.72-1.02*.57)*(theta(j)-
45*3.14159/180)/(10*3.14159/180))*uprate;%[MW/mA2]
elseif theta(j)<=65*3.14159/180
qdot(j)=(1.1*.72+(1.25*.85-1.1*.72)*(theta(j)-
55*3.14159/180)/(10*3.14159/180))*uprate;%[MW/mA2]
elseif theta(j)<=70*3.14159/180
qdot(j)=(1.3*1 )*uprate;% [MW/mA 2]
else
qdot(j)=0*uprate;
end
flow(27j)=qdot(j);
end
phase=0;
walltemp(1)=373;%initial wall temperature [K]
temp(1)=373;%initial bulk temperature (of subcooled liquid) [K]
num=1;
while phase==0
if num==1
enthalpy(num)=hf(1 00)*1 000+qdot(num)*106*geo(13,num)*2*3.14159*geo(17,num)/mdot;%enth
alpy [J/kg], initial enthalpy at 373 K, 152810 Pa
P(num)=l/vf(373-273)*9.81*(3.826-geo(10,num))+101325-0.5*mdotA2*vf(373 -
273)/2/0.145209;%initial pressure in Pa minus form inlet (k=0.5)
Dh(num)=geo(21 ,num);%hydraulic diameter [m], Dh=Do-Di
hfl=461300;%saturated liquid enthalpy at 1.4 atm [J/kg]
hfgl=2230200;%heat of vaporization at 1.4 atm [J/kg]
ff(num)=381.865+(P(num)-1 37169)/(152810-137169)*(385.086-381.865); %saturated liquid
temperature [K]
xe(num)=(enthalpy(num)-hfl)/hfgl;%equilibrium quality
temp(num)=xe(num)*(hfgl)/4183+385;%bulk temperature of subcooled liquid [K]
rhol(num)=998-(temp(num)-293)/80*(998-958.313);%subcooled liquid density [kg/m3]
rhog(num)=0.59773+(P(num)-101400)/(143300-101400)*(0.82645-0.59773);
Pr(num)=6-(temp(num)-293)/80*(6-1.76);%Prandtl number
k(num)=0.606+(temp(num)-293)/80*(0.68-.606);%liquid conductivity
area(num)=geo(22,num);%flow area
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Resub(num)=mdot*Dh(num)/area(num)/(279*1 O^-6);%Reynolds number
h(num)=k(num)/Dh(num)*0.023*(Resub(num))^0.8*(Pr(num))^0.4;%heat transfer coefficient,
Dittus-Boelter
walltemp(num)=qdot(num)*10^ 6/h(num)+temp(num);
flow(1 ,num)=enthalpy(num);
flow(2,num)=0;%quality
flow(3,num)=0;%void fraction
flow(4,num)=rhol(num);
flow(6,num)=Resub(num);%Reynolds Number
flow(7,num)=0.184/(flow(6,num))AO.2*geo(23,num)/geo(21 ,num)*mdotA2/(2*flow(4,num)*(geo(22,
num))A2);%pressure loss
accout(num)=0;
accin(num)=0;
flow(9,num)=accout(num)-accin(num);%acceleration term
flow(20,num)=xe(num);
flow(21 ,num)=temp(num);%bulk temperature
flow(22,num)=qdot(num)*10^ 6*geo(1 3,num)*2*3.14159*geo(1 7,num);%power
if theta(num)>=(3.14159/2)
theta(num)=(3.14159/2);
phi(num)=(3.14159/2);
end
SAO=(0.65444)+(-1.2018)*0.076*log(mdot/geo(22,num))+(-
0.008388)/(0.1 )A2+(0.000179)*(mdot/geo(22,num))+(1.36899)*0.076/0.1+(-
0.077415)*0.076/(0.1 )A2+(0.024967)*0.1*(log(mdot/geo(22,num)))A2;
SA1 =(-0.086511)*(log(mdot/geo(22,num)))A2+(-4.49425)*0.076*log(mdot/geo(22,num));
SA2=(9.28489)*0.076;
SA3=(-
0.0066169)*(Iog(mdot/geo(22,num)))A2+(11.62546)*0.076*0.1 +(0.855759)*xe(num)*log(mdot/geo
(22,num));
SA4=(-1.74177)*0.1+(0.182895)*log(mdot/geo(22,num))+(-
1.8898)*xe(num)+(2.2636)*0.076;
flow(23,num)=(SAO+SA1*xe(num)+SA2*(xe(num))^2+SA3*theta(num)+SA4*(theta(num))^2)*1OA
6;%critical heat flux
if phi(num)>=150/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,num)=(4.8*flow(23,num))*multiplier;%nanofluid critical heat flux (multiplier% of
graph)
elseif phi(num)>135/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,num)=((3+(phi(num)-135/180*(3.14159))1(15/180*(3.14159))*(4.8-
3))*flow(23,num))*multiplier;
elseif phi(num)>120/1 80*(3.14159)
flow(25,num)=((2.5+(phi(num)-120/180*(3.14159))/(15/180*(3.14159))*(3-
2.5))*flow(23,num))*multiplier;
elseif phi(num)>90/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,num)=((2.1+(phi(num)-90/180*(3.14159))/(30/180*(3.14159))*(2.5-
2.1))*flow(23,num))*multiplier;
else
end
flow(24,num)=flow(23,num)/(qdot(num)*10A6);%dnbr
flow(26,num)=flow(25,num)/(qdot(num)*10^6);%nanofluid dnbr
num=num+l;
else
enthalpy(num)=flow(1 ,num-
1)+qdot(num)*10^6*geo(13,num)*2*3.14159*geo(17,num)/mdot;%enthalpy [J/kg]
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P(num)=P(num-1 )-flow(7,num-1 )-flow(9,num-1)-1/vf(temp(num-1 )-273)*9.81*(geo(10,num)-
geo(1 O,num-1));
Dh(num)=geo(21,num);%hydraulic diameter [m], Dh=Do-Di
hfl=461300;%saturated liquid enthalpy at 1.4 atm [J/kg]
hfgl=2230200;%heat of vaporization at 1.4 atm [J/kg]
ff(num)=381.865+(P(num)-137169)/(152810-137169)*(385.086-381.865);%saturated liquid
temperature [K]
xe(num)=(enthalpy(num)-(hfl))/(hfgl);%equilibrium quality
temp(num)=xe(num)*(hfgl)/4183+385;%bulk temperature of subcooled liquid (K]
rhol(num)=998-(temp(num)-293)/80*(998-958.313);%subcooled liquid density [kg/m3]
rhog(num)=0.59773+(P(num)-101400)/(143300-101400)*(0.82645-0.59773);
Pr(num)=6-(temp(num)-293)/80*(6-1.76);% Prandtl number
k(num)=0.606+(temp(num)-293)/80*(0.68-.606);%liquid conductivity
%k(num)=Kf(temp(num)-273);%Iiquid conductivity
area(num)=geo(22,num);%flow area
Resub(num)=mdot*Dh(num)/area(num)/(279*10^-6);%Reynolds number
h(num)=k(num)/Dh(num)*0.023*(Resub(num))^0.8*(Pr(num))^0.4;%heat transfer coefficient,
Dittus-Boelter
walltemp(num)=qdot(num)* 10^6/h(num)+temp(num);
flow( 1,num)=enthalpy(num);
flow(2,num)=0;%quality
flow(3,num)=0;%void fraction
flow(4,num)=rhol(num);
flow(6,num)=Resub(num);%Reynolds Number
flow(7,num)=0.184/(flow(6,num))AO.2*geo(23,num)/geo(21 ,num)*mdotA2/(2*flow(4,num)*(geo(22,
num))A2);%pressure loss
if flow(3,num)==0
accout(num)=2*mdotA2/(geo(22,num)+geo(22,num-
1 ))*(1/(rhol(num)*geo(22,num))));%acceleration out term
accin(num)=accout(num-1);%acceleration in term
flow(1 9,num)=rhol(num);
else
accout(num)=2*mdotA2/(geo(22,num)+geo(22,num -
1))*((flow(2,num))A2/(flow(3,num)*0.88)+(1-flow(2,num))A2/((1-
flow(3,num))*950))/geo(22,num);%acceleration out term
accin(num)=accout(num-1);%acceleration in term
rhop(num)=((flow(2,num))A2/(flow(3,num)*0.88)+(1-flow(2,num))A2/((1-
flow(3,num))*950)) ^ - 1;
flow(19,num)=rhop(num);
end
flow(9,num)=accout(num)-accin(num);%acceleration term
flow(20,num)=xe(num);
flow(21,num)=temp(num);%bulk temperature
flow(22,num)=qdot(num)*10 6*geo(1 3,num)*2*3.14159*geo(1 7,num);%power
if theta(num)>=(3.14159/2)
theta(num)=(3.14159/2);
phi(num)=(3.14159/2);
end
SAO=(0.65444)+(-1.2018)*0.076*log(mdot/geo(22,num))+(-
0.008388)/(0.1 )A2+(0.000179)*(mdot/geo(22,num))+(1.36899)'0.076/0.1 +(-
0.077415)*0.076/(0.1 )^2+(0.024967)*0.1*(log(mdot/geo(22,num)))A2;
SA1 =(-0.086511 )*(Iog(mdot/geo(22,num)))^2+(-4.494250.076*og(mdot/geo(22,num));
SA2=(9.28489)*0.076;
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SA3=(-
0.0066169)*(log(mdot/geo(22,num)))A2+(11.62546)*0.076*0.1 +(0.855759)*xe(num)*log(mdot/geo
(22,num));
SA4=(-1.74177)*0.1 +(0.1 82895)*Iog(mdot/geo(22,num))+(-
1.8898)*xe(num)+(2.2636)*0.076;
flow(23,num)=(SAO+SA1*xe(num)+SA2*(xe(num))A2+SA3*theta(num)+SA4*(theta(num))A2)*10O
6;%critical heat flux
if phi(num)>= 150/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,num)=(4.8*flow(23,num))*multiplier;%nanofluid critical heat flux
elseif phi(num)>135/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,num)=((3+(phi(num)-1 35/180*(3.14159))/(15/180*(3.14159))*(4.8-
3))*flow(23,num))*multiplier;
elseif phi(num)>120/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,num)=((2.5+(phi(num)-120/180*(3.14159))/(15/180*(3.14159))*(3-
2.5))*flow(23,num))*multiplier;
elseif phi(num)>90/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,num)=((2.1+(phi(num)-90/180*(3.14159))/(30/180*(3.14159))*(2.5-
2.1 ))*flow(23,num))*multiplier;
else
end
flow(24,num)=flow(23,num)/(qdot(num)*1 0^6);%dnbr
flow(26,num)--flow(25,num)/(qdot(num)*10^6);%nanofluid dnbr
if walltemp(num)>=tf%saturated liquid temperature at 1.5 atm [385 K]
phase=1;
xc=geo(9,num);
yc=geo(10,num);
hlonb=enthalpy(num);
xeonb=xe(num);
else
end
num=num+l;
end
end
for i=[num:n]
if flow(1,i-1)<=2676100%below bulk boiling
flow(1 ,i)=flow(1 ,i-1)+qdot(i)* 10^6*geo(1 3,i)*2*3.14159*geo(1 7,i)/mdot;%enthalpy [J/kg]
xe(i)=(flow(1,i)-hfl )/hfgl;
Dh(i)=geo(21,i);%hydraulic diameter [m], Dh=Do-Di
P(i)=P(i-1)-flow(7,i-1)-flow(9,i-1)-rhol(i-1)*9.81*(geo(10,i)-geo(10,i-1));
tsat(i)=373.15+(P(i)-101400)/(152330-101400)*(385-373.15);
tsat(num-1 )=373.15+(P(num-1 )-101400)/(152330-101400)*(385-373.15);
temp(i)=xe(i)*hfgl/4183+385;%bulk temperature of subcooled liquid [K]
if temp(i)>=tsat(i)
temp(i)=tsat(i);
else
end
rhol(i)=998-(temp(i)-293)/80*(998-958.313);%subcooled liquid density [kg/m3]
Pr(i)=6-(temp(i)-293)/80*(6-1.76);%Prandtl number
k(i)=0.606+(temp(i)-293)/80*(0.68-.606);%liquid conductivity
%k(i)=Kf(temp(i)-273);
area(i)=geo(22,i);%flow area
Re(i)=mdot*Dh(i)/area(i)/(279*10^-6);% Reynolds number
h(i)=k(i)/Dh(i)*0.023*(Re(i))AO.8*(Pr(i))^0.4;%heat transfer coefficient, Dittus-Boelter
walltemp(i)=qdot(i)*10^ 6/h(i)+temp(i);
flow(3,num-1 )=0;
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alphabub(num-1 )=flow(3,num-2);
alphabub(i)=flow(3,i-1);
tlc(num-1)=tsat(num-1)-(4183*(tsat(num-1 )-temp(num-1))+hfgl *flow(2,num-
1))/(4183*(1 -flow(2,num-1)));
tl(num-1)=tlc(num-1);
dz(num-1)=geo(23,num-1);
dz(i)=geo(23,i);
if alphabub(num-1)<10^-5
F4(num-1)=flow(3,num-2)*10^ 5;
alphabub(num-1)=10^-5;
else
F4(num-1)=l;
end
F3(num-1)=F4(num-1);
if alphabub(i)<10^-5
F4(i)=--flow(3,i-1 )*10^5;
alphabub(i)=10^-5;
else
F4(i)=1;
end
F3(i)=F4(i);
rhof=955;%saturated liquid density
rhog(i)=0.59773+(P(i)-101400)/(143300-101400)*(0.82645-0.59773);
if alphabub(num-1)<0.25
vflux(num-1)=mdot/rhol(num-1)/area(num-1)/(1-flow(2,num-2));
if abs(vflux(num-1))>0.61
phihif(num-1)=(1.639344*abs(vflux(num-1 )))^0.47;
else
phihif(num-1)=l;
end
C(num-1)=65-(5.69*1 O^-5)*(P(num-1)-10^5);
F5(num-1)=1.8*phihif(num-1)*C(num-1)*exp(-45*alphabub(num-1))+0.075;
else
F5(num-1)=0.075;
end
Hif(num-1 )=(F3(num-1 )*F5(num-l1 )*hfg 1 *rhog(num-1 )*rhof*alphabub(num-1 ))/(rhof-
rhog(num-1));
if alphabub(i)<0.25
vflux(i)=mdotlrhol(i)/area(i)/(1-flow(2,i-1));
if abs(vflux(i))>0.61
phihif(i)=(1.639344*abs(vflux(i)))^0.47;
else
phihif(i)=1;
end
C(i)=65-(5.69*10^-5)*(P(i) - 1 0 ^5 );
F5(i)=1.8*phihif(i)*C(i)*exp(-45*alphabub(i))+0.075;
else
F5(i)=0.075;
end
Hif(i)=(F3(i)*F5(i)*hfgl *rhog(i)*rhof*alphabub(i))/(rhof-rhog(i));
if qdot(i)==0
if tl(i-1)>=temp(i-1)
tl(i)=tl(i-1);
flow(2,i)=flow(2,i-1);
else
tl(i)=tl(i-i )+(Hif(i-1 )*(tsat(i-l)-tl(i-1 ))*area(i-l1 )*dz(i-1 ))/((-flow(2,i-1 ))*mdot*4183);
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collapse=300;
flow(2,i)=flow(2,i-1)-(Hif(i-1)*(tsat(i-1)-tl(i-1))*collapse*area(i-1)*dz(i-
1))/(mdot*hfgl);
if flow(2,i)<=0
flow(2,i)=0;
else
end
end
else
tl(i)=tlc(i-1);
flow(2,i)=xe(i)-xeonb*exp((xe(i)/xeonb)-l);%quality, Levy Model
end
hf2(i)=(419.04+(tsat(i)-373)/1 0*(461.30-419.04))*1 000;
hfg2(i)=(2257+(tsat(i)-373)/10*(2230.2-2257))*1000;
if hf2(i)<=flow(1,i)
flow(2,i)=(flow(1,i)-hf2(i))/(hfg2(i));
else
end
onephvis=0.000281832;%one phase viscosity
%onephvis=muf(temp(i)-273);
onephden(i)=rhol(i);%one phase density
onephre(i)=mdot*geo(21,i)/(geo(22,i)*onephvis);%one phase Re
[flow(3,i),jg(i),jf(i),c0(i)]=epri(flow(2,i),mdot,geo(22,i),angle(i),geo(21,i));
flow(4,i)=flow(3,i)*rhog(i)+(1-flow(3,i))*onephden(i);%density [kg/mA3]
flow(5,i)=flow(3,i)*0.000012+(1-flow(3,i))*0.000281832;%viscosity [N*s/mA2]
flow(6,i)=mdot*geo(21,i)/(geo(22,i)*flow(5,i));%Reynolds Number
flow(8,i)=onephre(i);
if flow(3,i)==0
flow(10,i)=100000;
else
flow(10,i)=jg(i)/jf(i)*(1 -flow(3,i))/flow(3,i);%slip ratio
end
flow( 11,i)=jg(i);
flow(12,i)=jf(i);
flow(1 3,i)=jg(i)/jf(i);
flow(1 6,i)=[1 +flow(2,i)*(onephden(i)/.59773-1)];
rhobar=(flow(2,i)/0.59773+(1-flow(2,i))/onephden(i))A-1;
We=mdotA2*geo(21,i)/((geo(22,i))A2*rhobar*0.0589);
Fr=mdotA2/(9.81*geo(21 ,i)*(rhobar)A2*(geo(22,i))A2);
Al =(1onephden()/0.59773)*(0.00028 12/0.000281832)A .2;
A2=(flow(2,i))A0.78*(1-flow(2,i))^0.224;
A3=(onephden(i)/0.59773)A0.91 *(0.000001 2/0.000281832)^0.1 9*(1-
0.0000012/0.000281832)^0.7;
flow(1 8,i)=A1 +3.24*A2*A3/(FrAO.045*We0A.035);%two phase flow friction factor Friedel
correlation
flow(7,i)=0.1 84/onephre(i)^0.2*geo(23,i)/geo(21 ,i)*mdotA2/(2*onephden(i)*(geo(22,i))A2)*flow(1 8,i)
;%pressure loss
if flow(3,i)==0
accout(i)=2*mdotA2/(geo(22,i)+geo(22,i-
1))*(1/(onephden(i)*geo(22,i)));%acceleration out term
accin(i)=accout(i-1 );%acceleration in term
flow(19,i)=rhol(i);
else
accout(i)=2*mdotA2/(geo(22,i)+geo(22,i-1 ))*((flow(2,i))A2/(flow(3,i)*rhog(i))+(1-
flow(2,i))^2/((1-flow(3,i))*onephden(i)))/geo(22,i);%acceleration out term
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accin(i)=accout(i-1);%acceleration in term
rhop(i)=((flow(2,i))^2/(flow(3,i)*rhog(i))+(1-flow(2,i))^2/((1 -flow(3,i))*onephden(i)))^-l;
flow(19,i)=rhop(i);
end
flow(9,i)=accout(i)-accin(i);%acceleration pressure loss
flow(20,i)=xe(i);
if flow(20,i)<=0
flow(21 ,i)=temp(i);%bulk temperature
else
flow(21,i)=373;
end
flow(22,i)=qdot(i)*10^A6*geo(1 3,i)*2*3.14159*geo(1 7,i);%power
tlc(i)=tsat(i)-(4183*(tsat(i)-temp(i))+hfg1 *flow(2,i))/(4183*(1 -flow(2,i)));
if theta(i)>=(3.14159/2)
theta(i)=(3.141 59/2);
phi(i)=(3.14159/2);
end
SAO=(0.65444)+(-1.2018)*0.076*Ilog(mdot/geo(22,i))+(-
0.008388)/(0.1 )A2+(0.000179)*(mdot/geo(22,i))+(1.36899)*0.076/0.1 +(-
0.077415)*0.076/(0.1)A2+(0.024967)*0.1*(log(mdot/geo(22,i)))A2;
SA1 =(-0.086511)*(log(mdot/geo(22,i)))A2+(-4.49425)*0.076*log(mdot/geo(22,i));
SA2=(9.28489)*0.076;
SA3=(-
0.0066169)*(log(mdot/geo(22,i)))f2+(11.62546)*0.076*0.1 +(0.855759)*xe(i)*Iog(mdot/geo(22,i));
SA4=(-1.74177)*0.1 +(0.1 82895)*Iog(mdot/geo(22,i))+(-1.8898)*xe(i)+(2.2636)*0.076;
flow(23,i)=(SAO+SA1*xe(i)+SA2*(xe(i))A2+SA3*theta(i)+SA4*(theta(i))A2)*1A6;%critical
heat flux
if phi(i)>=150/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,i)=(4.8*flow(23,i))*multiplier;%nanofluid critical heat flux
elseif phi(i)>135/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,i)=((3+(phi(i)-1 35/1 80*(3.14159))/(15/180*(3.14159))*(4.8-
3))*flow(23,i))*multiplier;
elseif phi(i)> 120/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,i)=((2.5+(phi(i)-120/180*(3.14159))/(15/180*(3.14159))*(3-
2.5))*flow(23,i))*multiplier;
elseif phi(i)>90/180*(3.14159)
flow(25,i)=((2.1 +(phi(i)-90/180*(3.14159))/(30/180*(3.14159))*(2.5-
2.1 ))*flow(23,i))*multiplier;
else
end
if qdot(i)==0
flow(24,i)=25;
flow(26,i)=25;
else
flow(24,i)=flow(23,i)/(qdot(i)*10^6);%dnbr
flow(26,i)=flow(25,i)/(qdot(i)* 10^6);%nanofluid dnbr
end
else
bulkboiling=1
end
end
flow(14,:)=geo(22,:);
flow(15,:)=cO;
flow(17,1)=cn;
%EPRI void fraction correlation
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function [alpha,jg,jf,cO]=epri(x,mdot,area,angle,dh)
epsilon=0.00005;
for alphal=[0:epsilon:1]
ang=angle*1 80/3.14159;
fr=(90-ang)/90;
jg=x*mdot/area/0.59773;
jf=(1-x)*mdot/area/958.313;
cl =4*221.2^2/(220.2);
L=(1-exp(-cl*alphal))/(1-exp(-cl));
liqRe=jf*958.313*dh/0.000281832;
vapRe=jg*0.59773*dh/0.000012;
if liqRe>vapRe
Re=liqRe;
else
Re=vapRe;
end
al =1/(1 +exp(-Re/60000));
bl=min(0.8,al);
kO=bl +(1-b1 )*(0.59773/958.313)A0.25;
r=(1.0+1.57*0.59773/958.313)/(1-bl);
cOv=L/(k0+(1-kO)*alphalA r);
c0h=(l+alphalA0.05*(1-alphal )A2)*cOv;
c0=fr*cOv+(1-fr)*cOh;
c5=(1 50/958.31 3*0.59773)A0.5;
c2=1/(1-exp(-c51(1-c5)));
c3=max(0.50,2*exp(-Re/60000));
c7=(0.09144/dh)^0.6;
c8=c7/(1-c7);
if c7>=1
c4= 1;
else
c4=1/(1-exp(-c8));
end
c9=(1-alphal)Abl;
vgjv=c9*1.41 *c2*c3*c4*(957.715*0.0589*9.81/958.313A2)^0.25;
vgjh=vgjv;
vgj=fr*vgjv+(1-fr)*vgjh;
if (co*(jg+jf)+vgj)==0
alpha2=0;
elseif jg==0
alpha2=0;
else
alpha2=jg/(c*(jg+jf)+vgj);
end
alpha2;
error=abs(alpha2-alphal);
if error<0.00005
break
else
end
end
alpha=0.5*(alphal +alpha2);
%Evaluator for AP1 000 for power uprate
function evaluator6(mdot,uprate)
[geo,dth,angle]=apl 000modinlet;
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[flow]=flow6001 (geo,mdot,dth,angle,uprate);
mdot=mdot;%mass flow used in energy
[rn,cn]=size(geo);
n=cn;
dsum=0;
hsum=0;
for i=[1:n-1]
dsum=dsum+((geo(10,i+l)-geo(10,i))*0.5*(flow(4,i+1)+flow(4,i)))A2;
hsum=hsum+(geo(10,i+l)-geo(10,i))A2;
end
aveden=(dsum/hsum)A.5;
gravity=(geo(10,n)-geo(10,1))*9.81*(952-aveden)
friction=sum(flow(7,:))
acceleration=sum(flow(9,:))
inletform=0.5*mdotA2*vf(373-273)/2/0.145209
form=gravity-friction-acceleration-inlefform%[N/mA2]
tpff=flow(18,262)%Friedel friction factor at limiting area
dens=955;
koutlet=(form)*2*dens*1.0/mdotA2/tpff
power=sum(flow(22,:))
mdotcalc=(2*dens*form*(1.27*tpff)-1 )^0.5
error=mdotcalc-mdot
%Graph Generator
function graphgenerator
mdot=860;
[geo,dth,angle]=apl 000modinlet;
[flow]=flow6001 (geo,mdot,dth,angle,2.1);
enthalpy=flow(1,:);
quality=flow(2,:);
voidf=flow(3,:);
density=flow(4,:);
Re=flow(6,:);
pressloss=flow(9,:)+flow(7,:);
onephre=flow(8,:);
slip=flow(10,:);
jg=flow(11,:);
jf=flow(12,:);
vfluxratio=flow(1 3,:);
area=flow(14,:);
c0=flow(15,:);
rhomplus=flow(1 9,:);
xe=flow(20,:);
temp=flow(21,:);
power=flow(22,:);
chf=flow(23,:);
dnbr-flow(24,:);
nanodnbr=flow(26,:);
qdot=flow(27,:);
tpff=flow(1 8,:);
[rn,cn]=size(geo);
n=cn;
cumploss(1)=0;%cumulative pressure loss
for i=[l:n]
ycoord(i)=geo(10,i)+2.16;
cumploss(i+l)=cumploss(i)+pressloss(i);
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G(i)=mdotlarea(i);
diff(i)=density(i)-rhomplus(i);
end
plot(flow(9,:),ycoord)
xlabel('CHF (W/m^2) ')
ylabel('Height (m)')
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NOMENCLATURE
A area [m2]
distribution parameter in EPRI
Co correlation
DH hydraulic diameter [m]
Fr Froude number
G mass flux [kg/m2.s]
H height [m]
K form loss coefficient
L length of channel [m]
Np phase change (Zuber) number
N, subcooling number
P decay power [W]
P pressure [MPa]
Po reactor operating power [W]
Pr Prandtl number
0 power [MW]
Qo maximum power [W]
Re Reynolds number
T temperature [K]
Vgi drift flux parameter in EPRI correlation
We Weber number
f friction factor
g acceleration due to gravity [m/s 2]
h enthalpy [J/kg]
h height [m]
j superficial velocity [m/s]
k form loss coefficient
k thermal conductivity [W/m.K]
1 average length of incremental volume [m]
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rh
q"
qCHF
Subscript
acceleration
bulk
cavity
channel
crit
exit
f
fg
form
friction
g
gravity
i
inlet
m
due to acceleration
of the bulk fluid
inside the cavity but outside the
channel
inside the channel
at the critical point
at the channel exit
of the liquid
difference between the vapor and liquid
values
due to form
due to friction
of the vapor
due to gravity
at the inlet
at the inlet
of the liquid
of the mixture
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mass flow rate
heat flux
critical heat flux
channel gap size
time after shutdown
time to core relocation
time in which water can remove the
same amount of decay power as a
nanofluid
flow quality
equilibrium quality
[kg/s]
[W/m 2]
[MW/m 2]
[m]
[s]
[s]
[s]
o at the outlet
onb at the outset of nucleate boiling
tp two-phase
sat at saturation
surface of the surface
wall of the wall
Greek
Ah subcooled enthalpy [J/kg]
AP pressure loss [Pa]
O angle from horizontal [rad]
<2 two-phase friction multiplier
a void fraction
q non-dimensional power
0 angle from vertical [deg]
Pl dynamic viscosity [Pa-s]
non-dimensional mass flow rate
p density [kg/m3 ]
p+ two-phase momentum density [kg/m3]
a surface tension [N/m]
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